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AN ERA OF CONTINUED NEGLECT: 
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF 
CONGRESSIONAL EXEMPTIONS  
FOR ALASKA NATIVES 
Abstract: Although Native Americans in the contiguous United States have bene-
fited from recent congressional reforms, Alaska Native communities were largely 
ignored. Despite the widely acknowledged crisis of sexual assault and domestic 
violence in rural Alaska Native communities, Congress has explicitly exempted 
Alaska from legislation that would otherwise give people in these communities 
the ability to protect themselves. Although public outcry has prompted pending 
legislation in Congress to repeal some of these exemptions, such as the Alaska 
Safe Families and Villages Act, even that legislation does not go far enough to 
achieve a permanent and effective solution to what is a life-or-death problem for 
many Alaska Natives. This Note argues that Congress and the State of Alaska 
should expand Alaska Native tribal sovereignty to give Alaska Native communi-
ties the ability to stem the tide of this epidemic. 
INTRODUCTION 
In October 2005, a twenty-six year old man in the Alaska Native1 village of 
Nunam Iqua beat his wife with a shotgun, pistol-whipped a friend, and raped his 
thirteen-year-old stepdaughter in front of three other children.2 This rampage 
lasted eight hours, exacerbated by a complete absence of law enforcement in this 
small rural Alaskan village of 200 people.3 With the closest law enforcement 
presence 150 miles away and unreachable by roads, it took Alaska State Troop-
ers four hours to arrive at Nunam Iqua and arrest the perpetrator.4 
Crimes of sexual assault and domestic violence like those experienced in 
Nunam Iqua are frequent occurrences in rural Alaska.5 Alaskan women are two 
                                                                                                                           
 1 In this Note, the term “Alaska Native” refers collectively to the indigenous peoples of Alaska, 
including the Tlingit, Haida, Aleut, Athabascan, Yup’ik, and Inupiat peoples. 
 2 See AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE 41 (2007), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/
pdfs/mazeofinjustice.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/79RR-W3NA; Laura S. Johnson, Frontier of Injus-
tice: Alaska Native Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 THE MODERN AMERICAN 2, 2 (2012), available at 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=tma, archived at 
http://perma.cc/55TE-3L3W; Megan Holland, Village Man Arrested Following Eight-Hour Rampage, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 25, 2005, at A1. 
 3 See Holland, supra note 2. 
 4 See id. 
 5 See INDIAN LAW AND ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFER 
41 (2013) [hereinafter ROADMAP], available at http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/index.html, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/T2PM-78W7 (noting that “Alaska Natives are disproportionately affected by 
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and a half times more likely to experience sexual assault and domestic violence 
in their lifetime than the national average, and Alaska Native women are ten 
times more likely to be a victim of such attacks than all other Alaskan women.6 
Over fifty-eight percent of Alaskan women have experienced violence by an in-
timate partner or other sexual violence in their lifetime, and more than seventy-
five communities in Alaska have no law enforcement presence whatsoever.7 
Because of these problems and others, on November 12, 2013, the Indian 
Law and Order Commission (“ILOC”) published its recommendations for Na-
tive American and Alaska Native criminal justice systems to the President of the 
United States and Congress.8 In this report, the ILOC criticized Alaska’s central-
ized law enforcement system and urged Congress to enact legislation that would 
grant Alaska Native tribes increased tribal jurisdiction to solve this long-standing 
problem.9 
                                                                                                                           
crime”); see also Sari Horwitz, In Rural Villages, Little Protections for Alaska Natives, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 3, 2014, at A1 (detailing how it took law enforcement eleven hours to respond to an apparent 
homicide of a thirteen-year-old girl in the Alaska Native community of Kake). 
 6 See Brentin Mock, Examining Palin’s Record on Violence Against Women, AMERICAN PRO-
SPECT (Sept. 18, 2008) http://prospect.org/article/examining-palins-record-violence-against-women, 
archived at http://perma.cc/T5GF-XUH3 (citing Alaska’s high rates of sexual assault and domestic 
violence). 
 7 See ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 39; STATE OF ALASKA COUNCIL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND 
SEXUAL ASSAULT, KEY RESULTS FROM THE 2010 ALASKA VICTIMIZATION SURVEY 2 (2010) [here-
inafter 2010 ALASKA VICTIMIZATION SURVEY], available at http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/research/
2010/1004.avs_2010/1004.07a.statewide_summary.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CXA3-PSF9. 
Estimates of intimate partner and sexual violence tend to be conservative due to a stigma of reporting. 
See 2010 ALASKA VICTIMIZATION SURVEY, supra at 2. The lack of law enforcement presence is 
largely due to a lack of resources. See Legislative Hearing on S. 1192, Alaska Safe Families and Vil-
lages Act of 2011, and S. 1763, Stand Against Violence and Empower Native Women Act Before S. 
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) [hereinafter Masters Testimony] (written testimony of 
Joseph Master, Comm’r, Alaska Dep’t of Pub. Safety), available at http://www.indian.senate.gov/
sites/default/files/upload/files/old_hearings/JoeMasterstestimony111011&pageid=9515.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/H54V-L763. 
 8 See ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 185 (describing the ILOC’s findings to the President and Con-
gress); Richard Mauer, Panel Slams Village Justice System, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 14, 
2013, at A1 (noting that the report was released that week). The ILOC was established by the Tribal 
Law and Order Act of 2010 (“TLOA”). Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 
§ 235, 124 Stat. 2261, 2282–86 (2010) (codified as amended in 25 U.S.C. § 2812 (2012)). 
 9 ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 35, 55 (reporting the ILOC’s conclusion that the centralized form of 
law enforcement in Alaska fails to properly handle crime in Alaska Native communities and recom-
mending that Congress give the communities criminal jurisdiction); see Mauer, supra note 8 (charac-
terizing the ILOC’s chapter on Alaska as “blistering”); see also Dana Fabe, Chief Justice, Sup. Ct. of 
Alaska, State of the Judiciary Address (Feb. 13, 2013) [hereinafter State of the Judiciary] (transcript 
available at http://courts.alaska.gov/soj/state13.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S9L7-WXAF) (re-
calling that Alaska Native communities have needed help for over two decades). Increasing law en-
forcement in rural Alaska Native communities would not solve the inherent problems associated with 
administering justice from afar. See ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 35 (arguing that Alaska Native com-
munities are better positioned to act with law enforcement authority than the State); Interview with 
Lloyd Benton Miller, Partner, Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Endreson & Perry LLP, in Anchorage, 
2014] Expanding Alaska Native Tribal Jurisdiction 1255 
In Alaska’s current political climate, the release of the ILOC’s report could 
not have come at a more relevant time.10 In recent years, the State of Alaska has 
challenged Alaska Native rights in high profile court cases concerning subsist-
ence hunting and fishing and tribal jurisdiction over child custody cases.11 After 
an extensive history of state governmental resistance to the expansion of tribal 
jurisdiction in the courts, the current administration in Alaska appears willing to 
explore the possibility of expanding some concurrent criminal jurisdiction to 
include Alaska Native tribal courts.12 All of this is occurring against a backdrop 
of the Alaska Governor’s “Choose Respect” media campaign to combat domes-
tic violence and sexual assault in Alaska.13  
Given the current focus on the subject, this Note proposes meaningful solu-
tions for reversing the problems of sexual assault and domestic violence by 
                                                                                                                           
Alaska (Mar. 4, 2014) (notes on file with author) (characterizing Alaska’s centralized law enforce-
ment as the “least able and least responsible”). 
 10 See Mauer, supra note 8 (noting that Alaska’s governor submitted a proposal to an Alaska 
Native tribal coalition the same day that would allow for some misdemeanor prosecutions in tribal 
courts). Alaska U.S. Senator Mark Begich asked for a hearing on the ILOC’s chapter on Alaska short-
ly after its release. Press Release, U.S. Senator Mark Begich, Begich Calls Findings of Report on 
Public Safety in Rural Alaska “Horrific” (Nov. 21, 2013) (available at http://www.begich.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=3ec91689-8cd7-43c7-bc3a-687abfba3b5d, archived at http://
perma.cc/T4PV-W6UW) (conveying concern for the “public safety inequalities in Alaska villages”). 
 11 See John v. Alaska, 720 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1759 (Mar. 
31, 2014) (addressing Alaska Native subsistence rights); Simmonds v. Parks, 329 P.3d 995, 998–99 
(Alaska 2014) (addressing whether an Alaska Native tribal court could terminate parental rights from 
a non-member parent); Richard Mauer, Natives Protest Parnell’s Decision, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Nov. 6, 2013, at A1 [hereinafter Mauer, Natives Protest Parnell’s Decision] (reporting on the 
State of Alaska’s petition for writ of certiorari in John v. Alaska); Richard Mauer, State Goes to Bat 
for Rights of Convicted Wife-Beater, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 26, 2013, at A1 [hereinafter 
Mauer, State Goes to Bat for Rights of Convicted Wife-Beater] (explaining the State of Alaska’s law-
suit challenging a tribal court’s finding that a parent in a child custody claim was declared an unfit 
parent). 
 12 See Kyle Hopkins, Parnell: Give Tribes Some Violence, Alcohol Cases, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Oct. 25, 2013, at A3 (reporting that Alaska’s Governor announced that he is considering giving 
limited criminal jurisdiction to tribal courts); Tribal Courts Role Expanded in Rural Alaska, (KTUU 
television broadcast Aug. 18, 2014), available at http://m.ktuu.com/news/tribal-courts-role-expanded-
in-rural-alaska/27595624, archived at http://perma.cc/P49Y-QXFC (reporting that the State of Alaska 
will now partner with Alaska Native tribal courts to allow tribal prosecutions of over forty minor 
offenses on a voluntary basis without the possibility of incarceration). Some have considered this 
political posturing in anticipation of the next gubernatorial race. See Julia O’Malley, Leader Tells of 
Struggles with Alcohol, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 25, 2013, at A1 (noting that the Governor’s 
announcement preceded a speech given by an Alaska Native gubernatorial challenger). 
 13 See Choose Respect, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF ALASKA http://gov.alaska.gov/parnell/
priorities/public-safety/choose-respect.html, archived at http://perma.cc/M9CP-666Q (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2014) (highlighting the increase in support of his Choose Respect campaign since its an-
nouncement in December 2009); John Sutter, The Rapist Next Door, CNN (Feb. 4, 2014), http://
www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/02/opinion/sutter-change-alaska-rape/index.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/DEM2-CYS5 (reporting that Alaska has the highest rate of rape in the country, which is 
three times above the national average). 
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granting Alaska Natives increased tribal jurisdiction.14 Part I provides an over-
view of the social and legal status of Alaska Natives.15 Part II then examines re-
cent congressional actions and how both the U.S. Congress and the State of 
Alaska have been unable to give the necessary authority to Alaska Natives to 
help police their own communities.16 Finally, Part III proposes solutions which 
grant additional tribal jurisdiction to Alaska Native communities while protect-
ing defendants’ constitutional rights.17 
I. THE FIRST ALASKANS OF THE LAST FRONTIER: AN OVERVIEW OF ALASKA 
NATIVE TRIBAL JURISDICTION  
Native American and Alaska Native law is both obscure and complex, and 
an understanding of historical context is necessary to appreciate the current legal 
status of tribal jurisdiction.18 Section A of this Part begins by explaining the cur-
rent challenges facing Alaska Natives.19 Section B summarizes the pertinent 
statutes and judicial decisions in Native American law over the past two hundred 
years.20 Section B then outlines Alaska Native law by deconstructing the rele-
vant statutory and common law.21 
A. Harsh Realities: Contemporary Challenges Facing Alaska Natives 
According to the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, there are 229 tribes in 
Alaska, comprising roughly forty percent of all federally recognized tribes in the 
United States.22 Alaska Natives comprise around fifteen percent of Alaska’s 
population and are fully integrated into the politics and economy of the State.23 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See infra notes 160–244 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 18–99 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 100–159 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 160–244 and accompanying text.  
 18 See ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 1, 15 
(2d ed. 2010) (describing the complexity and foreign nature of Native American law generally and 
emphasizing the importance of history in understanding Native American law); see also DAVID S. 
CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 2–4 (3d ed. 2012) (noting that 
current Justices still rely on three foundational decisions by Chief Justice John Marshall in deciding 
Native American issues). 
 19 See infra notes 22–33 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 34–99 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 34–99 and accompanying text. 
 22 ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 35 (noting that Alaska is home to approximately 40% of the feder-
ally recognized tribes in the U.S.); Alaska Region Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR: BUREAU 
OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/RegionalOffices/Alaska/index.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/58W3-ZZD4 (last visited Sept. 7, 2014) (reporting that there are currently 229 federal-
ly recognized tribes in Alaska). 
 23 See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 198 (reporting that about 25% of Alaska’s economy is 
attributable to Alaska Native Regional Corporations); STEPHEN HAYCOX, FRIGID EMBRACE 15 
(2002) (hypothesizing that Alaska Natives are the most politically empowered Native American 
group); Kirk Johnson, Alaska Race Sees Democrat Quit Campaign for Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 
2014] Expanding Alaska Native Tribal Jurisdiction 1257 
Due to the climate and vastness of Alaska, the practical challenges faced by 
Alaska Natives are unlike those faced by Native Americans in the contiguous 
United States.24 
Alaska Natives also constitute a diverse array of communities and opin-
ions.25 With high unemployment forcing large numbers of Alaska Natives to 
move from rural Alaska into larger cities to find employment, there is a large and 
growing divide between rural and urban groups of Alaska Natives.26 Additional-
ly, there is a growing gap between Alaska Natives who are shareholders in an 
Alaska Native Regional Corporation and those who are not.27 This structure has 
been subject to a great deal of criticism about whether these corporations create 
perverse incentives which pit rural Alaska Natives against those living in urban 
areas, because urban shareholders may care more about dividends and less about 
supporting and maintaining life in rural communities.28  
                                                                                                                           
2014, at A12 (reporting that an Alaska Native candidate is running for Lieutenant Governor of Alas-
ka); State and County QuickFacts: Alaska, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/02000.html, archived at http://perma.cc/DM7V-NS7C (last updated July 8, 2014) (finding 
that 14.8% of Alaska’s population identifies itself as “American Indian and Alaska Native alone” in 
2012).  
 24 See STEPHEN HAYCOX, ALASKA: AN AMERICAN COLONY, at vii, x (2002) (characterizing 
Alaska as “a vast, rugged, beautiful land”); Tegan Hanlon, Medicaid Ruling Hurts Natives, ANCHOR-
AGE DAILY NEWS, Dec. 29, 2013, at A1 (describing the third-world conditions in Alaska Native 
communities is caused by their remoteness); Anchorage Facts & Figures, ANCHORAGE CONVENTION 
& VISITORS BUREAU, http://www.anchorage.net/media/anchorage-facts, archived at http://perma.
cc/4A2R-MD7X (last visited Sept. 7, 2014) (highlighting that Alaska is “1/5 the size of the contigu-
ous” United States). To provide context, Alaska has such a low population density, that if the same 
average population density was applied to the island of Manhattan, only 28.4 people would live there. 
Compare 2010 Census: Table 14, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/
2012/tables/12s0014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S3GE-KRMB (reporting Alaska’s population 
density as 1.2 per square mile), with NYC Statistics, NYC & CO., http://www.nycgo.com/articles/nyc-
statistics-page, http://perma.cc/G3DS-GZRP (last visited Sept. 7, 2014) (identifying the size of Man-
hattan as being 23.7 square miles). 
 25 See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 198 (noting diversity in Alaska Native communities); 
ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 35 (noting that there are 229 federally recognized tribes in Alaska). 
 26 See INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL & ECONOMIC RESEARCH, STATUS OF ALASKA NATIVES 1, 11, 20 
(2004), available at http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/8(a)/e-book%20layout/B/B.1/Status
%20of%20AK%20Natives.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SJV8-TDVG (recording that around 42% 
of Alaska Natives live in urban areas as of 2004, with that number expected to climb to over 50% by 
2020 and that this drive to urban centers is caused by low job rates in rural areas); Horwitz, supra note 
5 (reporting that the Alaska Native community of Kake has an unemployment rate of 80%). In fact, 
one study found unemployment to be more of a problem than alcohol in Alaska Native communities. 
See Kyle Hopkins, Village Alcohol Bans Fail to Impact Suicide Rates, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, 
May 7, 2014, at A1 (reporting on a study that found villages that banned alcohol were less effective at 
deterring suicide than villages with economic opportunities). 
 27 See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 190–93, 198 (explaining that potentially as many as 
half of Alaska Natives today do not have stock because it was issued to those alive on December 18, 
1971 and many born since then have not inherited or otherwise been issued stock). 
 28 See HAYCOX, supra note 23, at 130–33 (highlighting the range of opinions about Alaska Na-
tive Regional Corporations and overall influence); Alan Boraas, Op-Ed., Indian Country Status Could 
Help Alaska Villages, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 9, 2014, available at http://www.adn.com/
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Alaska Natives are far more likely to be subject to a host of social ills than 
most U.S. citizens.29 For example, Alaska Natives currently make up a dispro-
portionate thirty-seven percent of the state’s prison population.30 Alaska Native 
women are two and a half times more likely to be victims of domestic violence 
and assault, and comprise forty-seven percent of the reported rape victims in 
Alaska.31 Alaska Native suicide rates are around four times the national aver-
age.32 These striking numbers have concerned leaders in the State of Alaska for 
decades and continue to be the subject of much debate and effort.33 
                                                                                                                           
article/20140509/alan-boraas-indian-country-status-could-help-alaska-villages?sp=/99/328//, archived 
at http://perma.cc/8C8V-FBUZ (opining that Alaska Native Regional Corporations “are designed to 
make money for shareholders, not solve social problems”). 
 29 See, e.g., Tribal Law and Order Act, Pub. L. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258, § 202(a)(5)(B) (2010) (codi-
fied as amended in 25 U.S.C. § 2801(a)(5)(B) (2012)) (finding that “34 percent of American Indian and 
Alaska Native women will be raped in their lifetimes”); Jennifer Canfield, Report: Safety, Justice Sys-
tems in Rural Alaska Worst in U.S., JUNEAU EMPIRE, Nov. 29, 2013, at A1, available at http://
juneauempire.com/state/2013-11-29/report-safety-justice-systems-rural-alaska-worst-us#.UuPpFhAo5pg, 
archived at http://perma.cc/CKB5-W56H (characterizing rural Alaska’s safety as “the worst in the Unit-
ed States”); Hanlon, supra note 24 (analogizing conditions in rural Alaska to third-world countries). 
 30 See 2012 Offender Profile, ALASKA DEP’T OF CORR., 13 (2013) http://www.correct.state.ak.us/
admin/docs/2012Profile07_FINAL.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EH2G-7QZF. 
 31 See ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 41. 
 32 Id. at 43. 
 33 See Richard Mauer, House Panel Says It Will Act on Federal Report on Rural Crime, AN-
CHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 12, 2014, at B1 (reporting on a hearing in the Alaska State Legislature 
on the ILOC’s Report); John D. Sutter, Governor: ‘Alaska Has an Epidemic,’ CNN (Feb. 7, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/03/opinion/sutter-alaska-rape-governor/index.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/WM7Q-5KP8 (reporting that Alaska Governor Sean Parnell characterizes the violence 
against women in Alaska as an “epidemic”); Press Release, U.S. Senator Mark Begich, supra note 10 
(emphasizing that the underlying problems plaguing Alaska Native communities “cannot be ig-
nored”); State of the Judiciary, supra note 9 (noting that rural Alaskan communities “still ‘cry out’ for 
meaningful solutions”). Some argue that increasing the police presence in rural Alaska Native com-
munities will help reverse the numbers. See Becky Bohrer, Alaska Seeks Ways to Bolster Village Pub-
lic Safety Officers, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS MINER (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.newsminer.com/
news/alaska_news/alaska-seeks-ways-to-bolster-village-public-safety-officers/article_7895316e-747c-
11e2-a4a7-0019bb30f31a.html, archived at http://perma.cc/G279-AD79 (reporting that rural Alaskan 
communities with a law enforcement presence experience 40% fewer serious injuries caused by as-
saults and a 350% increase in the likelihood that sexual assault cases will be prosecuted); Interview 
with Lloyd Benton Miller, supra note 9 (applauding Governor Parnell for increasing law enforcement 
in rural Alaska). But cf. Masters Testimony supra note 7 (applauding the State of Alaska’s efforts at 
bringing the number of communities without law enforcement down to only seventy-five). Others 
argue, which is the subject of this Note, that giving Alaska Natives increased tribal jurisdiction can 
also improve the situation. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 532–33 (highlighting the inability 
of non-tribal law enforcement to police tribal areas); ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 35 (arguing that 
Alaska Native communities are better positioned to act with law enforcement authority than the State); 
Rachel King, Bush Justice: The Intersection of Alaska Natives and the Criminal Justice System in 
Rural Alaska, 77 OR. L. REV. 1, 46–57 (1998) (recommending that Alaska Native communities be 
given prosecutorial powers over some criminal matters); Interview with Lloyd Benton Miller, supra 
note 9 (characterizing Alaska’s centralized law enforcement as “least able and least responsible”). 
2014] Expanding Alaska Native Tribal Jurisdiction 1259 
B. Defining Sovereignty: Alaska Native Tribal Jurisdiction Today 
The relationship between the federal government and Alaska Natives is 
much different than that of their Native American counterparts in the contiguous 
United States.34 Subsection 1 provides context by explaining the scope of Native 
American tribal jurisdiction.35 Subsection 2 summarizes the relationship be-
tween Alaska Natives and the federal government prior to the Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”) of 1971.36 Subsection 3 focuses on the im-
pacts of ANCSA, and how the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Alaska Native terri-
torial jurisdiction and sovereignty because of the terms of that settlement.37 Sub-
section 4 then examines how Alaskan courts have subsequently interpreted fed-
eral common law, and the current scope of Alaska Native tribal jurisdiction.38 
Finally, Subsection 5 explains the current uses and functionality of Alaska Na-
tive tribal courts.39 
1. Providing Context: A Brief Examination of Native American Tribal 
Jurisdiction 
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress plenary power to “regulate Com-
merce . . . with the Indian Tribes.”40 Because of the Commerce Clause, coupled 
with the Supremacy Clause,41 the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that 
Congress has full plenary powers with regard to Native Americans.42  
                                                                                                                           
 34 See HAYCOX, supra note 23, at 51 (recounting differences between Alaska Natives and Native 
Americans, including a lack of treaties, recognized tribes, and reservations); DONALD CRAIG MITCH-
ELL, SOLD AMERICAN 11 (1997) [hereinafter MITCHELL, SOLD AMERICAN] (discussing how Alaska 
Natives were treated differently than Native Americans). Many of these differences can be explained 
by timing and geography. See MITCHELL, supra at 11 (noting how Alaska Natives were different than 
most Native Americans because Alaska Natives lived in villages and there was little demand for land 
for settlers in Alaska); Donald Craig Mitchell, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie: Statutory Con-
struction or Judicial Usurpation? Why History Counts, 14 ALASKA L. REV. 353, 357 (1997) [herein-
after Mitchell, Why History Counts] (opining about how Congress’s policy toward Native Americans 
changed at the time of Alaska’s purchase). But see ERNEST GRUENING, THE STATE OF ALASKA, at 
xvii (1968) (arguing that the relationship between Alaska and the Federal government was largely 
shaped by neglect). 
 35 See infra notes 40–49 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 50–64 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 65–79 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 80–89 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 90–99 and accompanying text. 
 40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 41 See id., art. VI, cl. 2. 
 42 See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (“[T]he central function 
of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of 
Indian affairs.”); CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 20–21 (noting Congress’s assertion of plenary 
power over Native Americans); see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) 
(characterizing Native Americans as “domestic dependent nations”). Scholars note that many early 
foundational decisions relating to Native American law contain undertones of racial prejudice. See 
CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 3 (highlighting recent scholarly criticism for early Native Ameri-
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Congress has exercised its plenary power over Native Americans in a varie-
ty of ways that have led to the present legal landscape.43 Prior to the Civil War, 
the main congressional policy objective was to use treaties to force Native Amer-
icans on to reservations to make room for continued westward expansion.44 Dur-
ing this period, Congress enacted the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act in 1834, 
defining “Indian country” as land “west of the Mississippi . . . .”45 In 1887, Con-
gress advanced a new policy of assimilation by enacting the Indian General Al-
lotment Act, which purported to eventually eliminate the reservation system by 
educating Native Americans and giving them allotments of land with the hope of 
incorporating them as American citizens in the future.46 
                                                                                                                           
can decisions); Sherry Salway Black, American Indian Tribes and Structural Racism, 17 POVERTY & 
RACE, no. 6, Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 1, 1 (emphasizing that “one cannot overlook . . . the racial basis of 
many policies . . . that are the hallmarks of federal-Indian relations”); Jill Burke, Fairbanks Craigslist 
‘Rants’ Peel Back Layers of Anti-Native Racism, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS, July 19, 2014, http://
www.adn.com/article/20140719/fairbanks-craigslist-rants-peel-back-layers-anti-native-racism, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/8BUR-9668 (reporting on contemporary racist undertones in Alaska). Alt-
hough it is undisputed that Congress’s power is plenary, the U.S. Supreme Court has also held that 
“[Native American] tribes retain their existing sovereign powers” unless Congress clearly expresses 
an intent to divest them of their natural power. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 
(1978) (holding that tribes retain their sovereignty unless Congress legislates otherwise); United 
States v. Ryder, 110 U.S. 729, 740 (1884) (noting that only intentional congressional authorizations 
successfully divest tribes of sovereignty); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02[1], 
at 113 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter, COHEN’S HANDBOOK] (noting the judicial pre-
sumption of “liberally” construing treaties and statutes in favor of Native Americans). But see CASE & 
VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 4–5 (opining that current decisions tend to pull back from allowing in-
creased tribal sovereignty). 
 43 See Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Juris-
dictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 504 (1976) (using the term “jurisdictional maze” in reference 
to law enforcement on Native American lands); Mitchell, Why History Counts, supra note 34, at 356–
59 (explaining early congressional policies toward Native Americans and Alaska Natives in the mid to 
late nineteenth century). 
 44 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 42, § 1.03[4][a] at 41; Mitchell, Why History Counts, 
supra note 34, at 356–60 (outlining federal action toward Native Americans in a manner that “contin-
ues to haunt the United States government’s dealings with the descendants of the Native Americans 
who were the objects of those policies”). 
 45 See Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 1, 4 Stat. 729, 729. The definition of Indian country would 
later be defined in 1948 to include “any Indian reservation . . . all dependent Indian communities . . . 
[and] Indian allotments . . . .” Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (codified as amended in 18 
U.S.C. § 1151 (2012)). 
 46 See Dawes Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 388 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
25 U.S.C. (2012)) (authorizing the President to allot reservation lands to Indians); COHEN’S HAND-
BOOK, supra note 42, § 1.04 at 72 (explaining that the assimilationist doctrine was originally used to 
justify the congressional policy of making more room for settlers in the West while keeping the best 
interests of the Native Americans in mind); Mitchell, Why History Matters, supra note 34, at 359 
(noting that Congress’s policy toward Native Americans changed, at least partially, because they had 
been beaten militarily). The policy of assimilation is seen by many today as “an unmitigated disaster.” 
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 109, 112 (describing the enormous loss of land for Native 
American tribes and the genesis of “checkerboards” of Native American land). 
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Congress has continued to change its policy towards Native Americans in 
the last century, promoting integration and perpetuating the erosion of tribal sov-
ereignty.47 This trend continued with the enactment of Public Law 83-280 (“P.L. 
280”) in 1953, which gave specific states civil and criminal jurisdiction over 
Native Americans living within their boundaries.48 In response to the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s unwillingness to grant tribal sovereignty, the current national Na-
tive American rights movement has strongly advocated for a coordinated ap-
proach to increase tribal sovereignty in Indian country and strengthen the power 
of tribal courts.49 
2. Life Before Oil: Alaska Native Tribal Jurisdiction Prior to ANCSA 
When the United States purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867, very little 
was known about the land or its inhabitants.50 Although Congress knew that in-
digenous peoples were living in Alaska at that time, it never implemented the 
common policy of relocating Native Americans to make room for white settlers 
in Alaska.51 Alaska’s purchase also coincided with a shift in societal and con-
                                                                                                                           
 47 See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 5 (highlighting the “consistent erosion” of Native 
American tribal sovereignty that continues today). But see Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 
576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended in 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2012)) (repealing the Indian 
General Allotment Act); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 42, § 1.05 at 81 (discussing some of the 
changes brought about by the IRA); Mitchell, Why History Counts, supra note 34, at 364–65 (noting 
that the IRA strengthened Native American tribal governments). 
 48 See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588, 588–89 (codified as amended in 18 
U.S.C. § 1162 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012) for criminal and civil jurisdiction respectively) 
(applying initially to California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin). Alaska became a P.L. 
280 state in 1958. See Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545, 545 (codified as amend-
ed in 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012) for criminal and civil jurisdiction respec-
tively). 
 49 See Tribal Supreme Court Project, NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, http://sct.narf.org/
index.html, archived at http://perma.cc/MQ7R-W33X (last visited Sept. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Tribal 
Supreme Court Project] (detailing the coordinated efforts of Native Americans to gain tribal sover-
eignty after “devastating” opinions from the U.S. Supreme Court); see also CASE & VOLUCK, supra 
18, at 4–5 (opining that the “high-water mark of the Supreme Court’s modern tribal sovereignty juris-
prudence” ended in the 1970s). 
 50 See Morgan B. Sherwood, George Davidson and the Acquisition of Alaska, 28 PAC. HIST. REV. 
141, 141 (1959) (characterizing Alaska at the time of the purchase from Russia as “a vast terra incog-
nita”). Alaska Natives have expressed they should have been consulted prior to the purchase. See 
HAYCOX, supra note 24, at 175 (recording that Alaska Natives near Sitka frequently mentioned to the 
Americans that they still had not given permission for the Americans to be “subjected to their jurisdic-
tion”); MITCHELL, SOLD AMERICAN, supra note 34, at 31 (noting that sometimes the Alaska Natives 
threatened to “exact tribute” for allowing the Americans to be in Sitka). 
 51 See MITCHELL, SOLD AMERICAN, supra note 34, at 11. One explanation for this was the abun-
dance of land in Alaska and a small population. HAYCOX, supra note 24, at 199 (stating that only 
4,298 white settlers were counted in Alaska in the 1890 census); MITCHELL, SOLD AMERICAN, supra 
note 34, at 11 (discussing how Alaska Natives were needed by settlers for work at a time when labor 
was in high demand).  
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gressional opinion about indigenous peoples, resulting in the beginning of a dis-
tinct experience of tribal sovereignty for Alaska Natives.52 
For seventeen years after the purchase, the U.S. government considered 
Alaska a military district, with enforcement over the area shifting between the 
Army, the Navy, and a customs collector.53 During these years, the military 
treated Alaska as if it were Indian country for the purpose of prohibiting the im-
portation and sale of alcohol.54 This treatment, however, was rejected in 1872 by 
a Federal District Court in Oregon, forcing Congress to reestablish Indian coun-
try to all of Alaska the following year.55 
When Congress finally authorized limited powers of civil governance in 
Alaska by enacting the First Organic Act in 1884, Alaska Natives were treated 
just like everybody else, as U.S. citizens without separate sovereignty.56 In fact, 
in 1886, in In re Sah Quah, the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska held 
that “the Indians of Alaska are under the control of, and subject to the laws of, 
the United States.”57 Furthermore, the court noted the long-standing congres-
sional policy of considering Alaska Natives to be “dependent subjects” without 
any independent sovereignty.58 This apparent lack of distinction between the 
status of Alaska Natives and non-Natives is further highlighted by the language 
in the First Organic Act, which directed the federal Bureau of Education to pro-
vide education services to the children of Alaska “without reference to race.”59 
Some legal scholars argue that the legislative history of the First Organic Act 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 42, § 1.04 at 71–72 (noting that Congress’s policy of 
assimilation began shortly after the end of “treaty making in 1871”); Mitchell, Why History Counts, 
supra note 34, at 359. For additional commentary and criticism about this policy, see supra note 46 
and accompanying text. 
 53 GRUENING, supra note 34, at 33, 53. 
54 See Mitchell, Why History Counts, supra note 34, at 371–72 (noting that Alaska was treated as 
Indian country prior to the decision in United States v. Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. 1021 (D. Or. 1872)). En-
forcement of a prohibition on alcohol was extremely limited and ineffective. See HAYCOX, supra note 
24, at 180 (characterizing the smuggling of alcohol into Alaska as “rife” and arrests relating to alcohol 
as “common”); MITCHELL, SOLD AMERICAN, supra note 34, at 137–38 (explaining the relative ease 
of smuggling alcohol into Alaska by avoiding the infrequent enforcement visits of the Revenue Ma-
rine cutter). 
55 See Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 227, 17 Stat. 510, 530 (establishing Indian country “over all the main-
land, islands, and waters” of Alaska); Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. at 1024 (finding that Indian country cannot 
apply to Alaska without explicit congressional authorization). 
 56 See Organic Act of Alaska, May 17, 1884, ch. 53, § 1, 23 Stat. 24, 24 (establishing a civil gov-
ernment in Alaska); CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 24–25 (noting that Alaska Natives were giv-
en the same rights to land as non-Natives under the First Organic Act); Mitchell, Why History Counts, 
supra note 34, at 360 (showing that Alaska Natives were intended to be subjected to the American 
laws). 
 57 In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327, 329, 331 (D. Alaska 1886) (holding that Alaska Natives did not 
have the sovereignty to own slaves). 
 58 See id. at 329 (“The United States has at no time recognized any tribal independence or rela-
tions among these Indians . . . [and] it is clearly inferable that they have been and now are regarded as 
dependent subjects . . . subject to the jurisdiction of . . . the United States.”). 
 59 See § 13, 23 Stat. at 27–28. 
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demonstrates that Congress intended to treat Alaska Natives as American citi-
zens.60 
The United States’ relationship with Alaska Natives became increasingly 
complex in the twentieth century.61 A series of congressional acts and executive 
declarations began to distinguish the legal relationships and rights between Alas-
ka Natives and the rest of the country, including the formation of a number of 
reservations and tribal constitutions under the authority of the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act (“IRA”).62 Before congressional sentiment changed in 1949, execu-
tive designations created millions of acres of reservation land in Alaska.63 Con-
gress also enacted P.L. 280 in 1953—later extended to include Alaska in 1958—
an important piece of legislation that granted complete criminal and civil juris-
diction over all Indian country to the territorial (and later, state) government.64 
3. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: An Historic Settlement with 
Far-Reaching Impacts 
Spurred largely by the complicated patchwork of laws and the discovery of 
oil on the North Slope of Alaska, Congress enacted ANCSA in 1971.65 This 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See, CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 24–25; Mitchell, Why History Counts, supra note 34, 
at 360; see also S. REP. NO. 47-457, at 12 (1880) (recounting congressional testimony advocating for 
Alaska Natives to be treated as U.S. citizens). 
 61 See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 26 (recording many changes with the relationship 
between the United States and Alaska Natives starting in 1904). But see Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. Unit-
ed States, 348 U.S. 272, 278 (1955) (concluding that Alaska Natives had not received “any permanent 
rights in the lands of Alaska occupied by them” because Congress “merely [intended] to retain the 
status quo” after the First Organic Act); Mitchell, Why History Counts, supra note 34, at 361–62 
(characterizing congressional acts as not leading to any material changes in federal law). 
 62 See Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, § 17, 48 Stat. 984, 988 (1934) (codified as amended in 
25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2012)) (allowing the issuance of Indian charters); Act of May 1, 1936, ch. 
254, § 1, 49 Stat. 1250, 1250 (applying the IRA to Alaska); CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 28–30 
(explaining how the IRA, expanded to include Alaska Natives in 1936, allowed Alaska Natives to 
create constitutions and gave the Department of the Interior authority to designate land for reserva-
tions); Mitchell, Why History Counts, supra note 34, at 365–71 (emphasizing the limited impact the 
IRA inclusion of Alaska and the zeal displayed by Department of Interior officials in declaring reser-
vation land in Alaska). 
 63 See Mitchell, Why History Counts, supra note 34, at 370–71 (explaining congressional outrage 
over an outgoing Secretary of the Interior’s designation of nearly two million acres of reservation 
land, effectively putting an end to reservation designations in Alaska). 
 64 See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, §§ 2, 4, 67 Stat. 588, 588–89 (codified as 
amended in 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012)) for criminal and civil jurisdiction 
respectively); Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, §§ 1–2, 72 Stat. 545, 545 (extending P.L. 280 
to Alaska); John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 745 (Alaska 1999) (holding that P.L. 280 gave Alaska “ju-
risdiction over all civil and criminal matters arising in Indian country”); CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 
18, at 33 (characterizing P.L. 280 as congressional recognition of Alaska Natives’ inherent sovereign-
ty). 
 65 See Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified in 
43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1624 (2006 & Supp. 2011)); HAYCOX, supra note 23, at 83, 97–98 (noting that the 
oil industry “broke the deadlock” preventing ANCSA’s passage); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Repara-
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landmark piece of legislation has been noted as one of the most important and 
generous settlements for indigenous peoples in the United States.66 ANCSA 
awarded Alaska Natives almost one billion dollars and approximately forty-four 
million acres of land in exchange for extinguishing all title and sovereignty to 
their land.67 ANCSA also created twelve Alaska Native Regional Corporations to 
manage the land and assets and distribute the benefits to Alaska Native share-
holders and their descendants.68 Although there are differing opinions as to 
whether ANCSA was the best deal for Alaska Natives, most people have viewed 
it as a positive piece of legislation.69 
In the early 1980s, however, Alaska Natives began to advocate for tribal 
sovereignty.70 The villages’ desire to capture a greater share of the economic 
benefit of oil production and to obtain a greater say in hunting and fishing regu-
lation was a major reason for this push for tribal sovereignty.71 Additionally, ad-
vocates recognized the growing need to better deal with crime and self-policing 
                                                                                                                           
tions: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 30 B.C. L. REV. 477, 498 (1998) 
(noting that “the primary impetus” for ANCSA “was the need to clear land title for development of 
the Alaska oil pipeline”). Another impetus for ANCSA’s passage was U.S. Secretary of the Interior 
Stewart Udall’s “land freeze” in 1967 to protect Alaska Native’s claim to the land. See HAYCOX, 
supra note 23, at 92–93. 
 66 See HAYCOX, supra note 23, at 97–98 (characterizing ANCSA as being a generous settlement); 
DONALD CRAIG MITCHELL, TAKE MY LAND, TAKE MY LIFE 10 (2001) (“ANCSA remains the most 
generous and innovative aboriginal claims settlement in U.S. history.”). 
 67 See § 1603, 85 Stat. 688 (completely extinguishing all “aboriginal title in Alaska based on use 
and occupancy”); § 1605 (detailing the $962.5 million financial component of the settlement); 
§§ 1611–1613 (detailing the way Alaska Native villages could claim land under the settlement); AN-
DERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 841 (definitively noting that “ANCSA’s extinguishment of aborigi-
nal title was unambiguous”); HAYCOX, supra note 24, at 315 (estimating the amount of land conveyed 
to Alaska Natives at forty-four million acres). 
 68 See § 1602(b), 85 Stat. 688 (defining an Alaska Native as someone who is “one-fourth degree or 
more Alaska [Native]”); § 1606 (establishing twelve Alaska regional corporations); § 1606(g)(1)(B) 
(detailing that shares of settlement stock are to go to “Natives born after December 18, 1971, and . . . 
descendants of Natives born after December 18, 1971”). 
 69 See, e.g., ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 219 (noting that some have called ANCSA “a 
victory for the tribes”); HAYCOX, supra note 24, 283 (emphasizing that Alaska Natives were fully 
integrated in the enactment of ANCSA at every step); MITCHELL, SOLD AMERICAN, supra note 34, at 
12 (noting the inherent difficulties of conducting a cost/benefit analysis of ANCSA); MITCHELL, su-
pra note 66, at 10 (characterizing ANCSA as “the most generous and innovative aboriginal claims 
settlement in U.S. history”). But see ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 219–20 (positing that 
ANCSA contained provisions that continue to hurt Alaska Natives, going so far as to call some of the 
impacts a “poison pill”); HAYCOX, supra note 23, at 132 (noting that some Alaska Native villagers 
were dissatisfied with ANCSA immediately after its enactment). 
 70 See Mitchell, Why History Counts, supra note 34, at 391–92, 394 (characterizing the Alaska 
Native sovereignty group movement as beginning to exist in the early 1980s as a counter to ANCSA). 
But see CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 373 (stating that United States recognition of tribal sover-
eignty existed since the 1830s). 
 71 See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 374 (explaining that tribal sovereignty generally con-
notes power to regulate hunting, fishing, and “conduct of nonmembers”); Mitchell, Why History 
Counts, supra note 34, at 412 (describing how the impetus for asserting tribal jurisdiction concerned 
oil and gas taxation). 
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in rural Alaskan villages.72 At the genesis of this movement, the State of Alaska 
fought vigorously against tribal jurisdiction, declaring that “Alaska is one coun-
try, one people” and positing that ANCSA specifically extinguished tribal sover-
eignty in Alaska.73 
After the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit published multiple 
opinions in support of tribal jurisdiction,74 in 1998, in Alaska v. Native Village of 
Venetie Tribal Government (“Venetie”), the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously 
held that Alaska Natives gave up their tribal territorial jurisdiction when they 
agreed to the terms of ANCSA in 1971.75 The Court found that ANCSA treated 
Alaska Natives differently from other Native Americans by giving the land in the 
settlement agreement in fee simple title, rather than establishing reservations.76 
The Court was quick to point out that this was done “to avoid a ‘lengthy ward-
ship or trusteeship’” and to give Alaska jurisdiction over Alaska Natives along 
with its other citizens.77 Analyzing the legislative history of ANCSA, the U.S. 
Supreme Court determined that virtually all of the Alaska Native land in Alaska 
does not constitute “Indian country” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151.78 Conse-
                                                                                                                           
72 See Susanne Di Pietro, Tribal Court Jurisdiction and Public Law 280: What Role for Tribal Courts 
in Alaska?, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 335, 337 (1993) (explaining how Alaska Native tribal courts are used 
for dispute resolution); see also Mitchell Why History Counts, supra note 34, at 393 n.175 (opining 
that early Alaska Native tribal sovereignty advocates were interested in defining the scope of Alaska 
Native tribal territorial jurisdiction); State of the Judiciary, supra note 9, at 7–8 (recalling the long-
standing difficulties of administering justice in rural Alaska). 
73 See 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (2006) (declaring that the goal of ANCSA is to avoid “creating a reserva-
tion system or lengthy wardship or trusteeship”); Alaska Admin. Order No. 125 (1991) (signed by 
Gov. Walter J. Hickel), available at http://www.gov.state.ak.us/admin-orders/125.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/WN5J-NCX2 (revoking a prior administrative order inconsistent with the principal 
that “Alaska is one country, one people); Di Pietro, supra note 72, at 342 (noting that the Alaska State 
Supreme Court and the Governor initially opposed efforts to expand Alaska Native tribal sovereign-
ty); see also Mitchell, Why History Counts, supra note 34, at 385–91 (discussing ANCSA’s congres-
sional history and the goal of avoiding the creation of reservations). 
 74 Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir. 1988) (Venetie I) (holding that 
tribal sovereignty analysis does not end with existing statutes); Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Trib-
al Gov’t, 101 F.3d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir. 1996) (Venetie II) (concluding that ANCSA did not extinguish 
Alaska Native tribal sovereignty or Indian country in Alaska), rev’d, 522 U.S. 520 (1998). 
 75 See Venetie, 522 U.S. at 523 (holding that the land held by Alaska Natives as a result of 
ANCSA is not Indian country). 
 76 Venetie, 522 U.S. at 533; see § 1601(b), 85 Stat. 688. The Court emphasized that a primary 
purpose of ANCSA was “to end paternalism in federal Indian relations.” Venetie, 522 U.S. at 534. 
Fee-simple title is “the broadest property interest allowed by law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 691 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 77 Venetie, 522 U.S. at 533; see § 1601(b), 85 Stat. 688. 
 78 Venetie, 522 U.S. at 532 (holding that ANCSA lands do not fall under any definition in § 1151 
and therefore cannot be considered Indian country); see 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (defining Indian 
country as “land within the limits of any Indian reservation . . . all dependent Indian communities . . . 
[and] all Indian allotments”). The Court limited recent judicial expansions of the definition of Indian 
country to the specific fact patterns of those cases. See Venetie, 522 U.S. at 528, 530. This holding has 
been characterized by some legal scholars as ANCSA’s “poison pill.” See ANDERSON ET AL., supra 
note 18, at 220. Others have noted that this definitional expansion of the courts is where the Ninth 
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quently, with ANCSA lands designated as fee simple and not Indian country, the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision essentially extinguished territorial tribal jurisdic-
tion for Alaska Natives.79 
4. The Continued Perseverance of Alaska Native Tribal Sovereignty in the 
Wake of Venetie  
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Venetie, the Alaska Su-
preme Court interpreted Venetie’s implications to determine whether Alaska Na-
tives still had inherent tribal sovereignty unrelated to territory.80 In 1999, in John 
v. Baker, the Alaska Supreme Court examined whether Alaska Native tribal 
courts had concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate child custody cases among Alas-
ka Natives.81 Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Venetie that abolished 
Alaska Native territorial sovereignty under the federal definition of Indian coun-
try, the Alaska Supreme Court held that not all aspects of tribal sovereignty were 
divested through ANCSA.82 The court reasoned that, even without territorial 
jurisdiction, Alaska Natives still have inherent tribal jurisdiction to regulate 
“domestic relations among members.”83  
Explaining that tribal sovereignty had historically included both territorial 
and membership components, the Alaska Supreme Court reasoned that Alaska 
Natives did not give up this aspect of self-governance through ANCSA.84 The 
court noted that, according to federal common law, indigenous rights cannot be 
                                                                                                                           
Circuit strayed. See Mitchell, Why History Counts, supra note 34, at 425 (explaining the expansion of 
the judicial definition of Indian country as starting with United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022 (10th 
Cir. 1971)). The only currently existing reservation in Alaska is Metlekatla, in Southeast Alaska. See 
§ 1618(a), 85 Stat. 688 (exempting “the Metlakatla Indian community of the Annette Island Reserve” 
from ANCSA’s revocation of rights); Venetie, 522 U.S. at 524 (noting that Metlakatla is the only 
remaining reservation in Alaska since it was exempted from ANCSA). 
 79 See Venetie, 522 U.S. at 523. 
 80 See Baker, 982 P.2d at 744 (noting that the Alaska Supreme Court requested a supplemental 
briefing in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Venetie); id. at 748–49 (“Today we must 
decide for the first time . . . [whether] Alaska Native villages have inherent, non-territorial sovereign-
ty. . . . [W]e hold that Alaska Native tribes, by virtue of their inherent powers as sovereign nations, do 
possess that authority.”). 
 81 See id. at 743, 748–49. Concurrent jurisdiction is when jurisdiction can “be exercised simulta-
neously by more than one court over the same subject matter and within the same territory.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 928 (9th ed. 2009). 
 82 See Baker, 982 P.2d at 748 (finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act and P.L. 280 do not 
apply in this case as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Venetie); id. at 751–52 (declaring 
that Alaska Natives “retain their sovereign powers to regulate internal domestic affairs unless Con-
gress specifically” exercises its plenary power to take it away).  
 83 See id. at 758. 
 84 See id. at 753 (emphasizing that “Congress did not intend for ANCSA to divest tribes of their 
powers to adjudicate domestic disputes between members”); id. at 754 (holding that “the nature of 
tribal sovereignty stems from two intertwined sources: tribal membership and tribal land”). 
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terminated without Congress expressly doing so.85 By extending this logic, the 
court determined that Alaska Natives’ “sovereign power to regulate the internal 
affairs of its members” applies to child custody cases.86 
Recently, the Alaska Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Baker and its 
support for Alaska Native tribal sovereignty and concurrent jurisdiction.87 In 
2011, in  McCrary v. Ivanof Bay Village, the Alaska Supreme Court, in affirming 
the underlying logic of Baker, reasoned that because the Alaska Native village of 
Ivanof Bay had sovereign immunity, the party seeking damages from Ivanof Bay 
for breach of contract had no remedy in state court.88 In 2014, in Simmonds v. 
Parks, the Alaska Supreme Court legitimized Alaska Native tribal court appeals, 
holding that state jurisdictional and due process claims can only be brought after 
exhausting tribal court remedies.89 
5. Alaska Native Tribal Courts: Alternative Justice in Alaska 
As a result of this unique historical and legal framework, Alaska Native 
tribal courts differ significantly from most Native American tribal courts.90 Be-
cause many Alaska Native communities are small and geographically spread out, 
and it has been difficult for Alaska Natives to assert their tribal sovereignty, the 
Alaska Native tribal courts tend to be underdeveloped compared to other Native 
American tribal courts.91 Even when Alaska Native communities have a tribal 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See id. at 752 (“Courts must resolve ambiguities in statutes affecting the rights of Native Amer-
icans in favor of Native Americans.”); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 42, § 2.02, at 113 
(explaining a long held judicial presumption of “liberally” construing treaties and statutes in favor of 
Native Americans). 
 86 Baker, 982 P.2d at 759. 
 87 See Simmonds, 329 P.3d at 1008 (holding that in order to challenge tribal court child custody 
proceedings, one must first “exhaust available tribal court remedies” before filing “minimum due 
process and jurisdictional claims in Alaska state court”); McCrary v. Ivanof Bay Vill., 265 P.3d 337, 
338–39, 342 (Alaska 2011) (declining unanimously to overturn Baker and holding that federally rec-
ognized Alaska Native villages enjoy sovereign immunity).  
 88 See 265 P.3d at 342 (“Because Ivanof Bay is a federally recognized tribe, it is entitled to sover-
eign immunity.”). 
 89 See 329 P.3d at 1008 (holding that one must first “exhaust available tribal court remedies” 
before filing “minimum due process and jurisdictional claims in Alaska state court”). 
 90 Compare Sari Horwitz, Arizona Tribe Set to Prosecute First Non-Indian Under a New Law, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/arizona-tribe-set-to-prosecute-
first-non-indian-under-a-new-law/2014/04/18/127a202a-bf20-11e3-bcec-b71ee10e9bc3_story.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3J2B-Z243 (describing the importance having a “$21 million state-of-the-
art courthouse” for convincing conservative Republicans that the Pascua Yaqui Indians were capable 
of fairly trying non-Indians for domestic violence cases), with Di Pietro, supra note 72, at 337 (con-
ceding the presence of only a handful of “well-established” tribal courts in Alaska); see Telephone 
Interview with Donald Craig Mitchell, attorney and author on federal Indian law (Nov. 6, 2013) (notes 
on file with author) (implying that Alaska Native tribal courts are unlike the tribal courts of the Nava-
jo). 
 91 See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 438 (noting that there are “[o]ver one hundred tribal 
courts and councils . . . actively resolving disputes” on a voluntary basis in Alaska Native communi-
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court system, each court system is vastly different from the next in regards to 
administration and protections for defendants.92 
It is well established that Alaska Native tribal courts do not have criminal 
jurisdiction over non-member defendants without express authority from either 
Congress or the Alaska State Legislature.93 If courts tried to assert this type of 
criminal jurisdiction in Alaska Native courts, they would directly conflict with 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding that Alaska Native land is not considered In-
dian country, and therefore cannot be under tribal territorial sovereignty.94 Fur-
thermore, the State of Alaska retains exclusive criminal jurisdiction within its 
boundaries as a P.L. 280 State.95 
Even with these barriers, there are a few Alaska Native communities that 
have established active tribal court systems.96 For example, in the Alaska Native 
village of Kake, the tribal court engages in “Circle Peacemaking,” a form of dis-
pute resolution.97 When all of the parties agree, State courts allow for these non-
                                                                                                                           
ties); Di Pietro, supra note 72, at 336–37 (observing that the reliance on tribal courts in Alaska has 
fluctuated over time). But see Simmonds, 329 P.3d at 1007–08 (legitimizing the Alaska Native tribal 
court appeals process). 
 92 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 42, § 4.07[3][d][i] at 352 (noting the historical variation 
of Alaska Native tribal governments). 
 93 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) (holding that “Indians do 
not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative delegation of such power by Con-
gress”); CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 439 (recognizing the difficulty of tribal courts asserting 
criminal jurisdiction without any territorial jurisdiction in the wake of Venetie); COHEN’S HAND-
BOOK, supra note 42, § 9.04 at 765–66 (explaining how congressional and judicial actions have de-
fined the scope of tribal criminal jurisdiction); Telephone Interview with Donald Craig Mitchell, su-
pra note 90 (noting that everyone agrees there cannot be any criminal jurisdiction unless Congress 
affirmatively bestows it). But cf. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 440 (arguing that the Alaska 
Supreme Court could expand the uses of tribal courts). 
 94 See Venetie, 522 U.S. at 526 (holding that because there is no Indian country in Alaska, Alaska 
Natives are “sovereigns without territorial reach”); ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 220 (explain-
ing that the holding in Venetie means that there are no “lands over which a Native village can exercise 
territorial jurisdiction”); Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, “Indian Country” and the 
Nature and Scope of Tribal Self-Government in Alaska, 22 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2005) (noting 
that the Court in Venetie held that there could be no Indian country in Alaska, which relates to crimi-
nal jurisdiction). 
 95 See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, §§ 2, 4, 67 Stat. 588, 588–89 (codified as 
amended in 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012)) for criminal and civil jurisdiction 
respectively); Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, §§ 1–2, 72 Stat. 545, 545 (extending P.L. 280 
to Alaska); Telephone Interview with Donald Craig Mitchell, supra note 90 (emphasizing that Alas-
ka’s exclusive criminal jurisdiction is well settled). 
 96 See Di Pietro, supra note 72, at 337 (highlighting the Minto and Sitka Tribal courts as being 
“well-established”); David Avraham Voluck, Counterpoint: Alaska’s Sister Sovereign: Federally 
Recognized Tribal Courts by Judge David Voluck, ALASKA B. RAG 3 (Apr.–June 2014) (stating that, 
although “[t]he full scope of activity for Alaska’s tribal courts remain largely unmeasured, . . . it is 
well understood in the field that Alaska’s tribal courts divert and reduce some of the crushing weight 
of the civil docket . . . from an already overburdened Alaska Court System”). 
 97 See Lisa Rieger, Circle Peacemaking, 17 ALASKA JUST. F., no. 4, Winter 2001, at 1, 7; Hor-
witz, supra note 5. This form of “restorative justice” is loosely modeled after system based in the 
Yukon Territory in Canada. Rieger, supra, at 1. To date, the process in Kake has been used largely in 
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binding discussions to substitute for formal hearings in some criminal proceed-
ings.98 This is largely an exception, however, and most tribal courts are limited 
to cases set out by the Alaska Supreme Court.99 
II. FAILING TO ACT: EXAMINING THE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT, THE 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REAUTHORIZATION ACT, AND THE ALASKA 
SAFE FAMILIES AND VILLAGES ACT FROM ALASKA’S PERSPECTIVE 
In recent years, Congress has enacted two significant pieces of legislation 
expanding the criminal jurisdiction of Native American tribal governments.100 
Yet these recent enactments explicitly exempt Alaska Natives.101 Recently, in 
response to political pressure regarding these conspicuous exemptions, Alaska’s 
U.S. Senate delegation jointly sponsored new legislation to address the criti-
cism.102 Section A of this Part examines the changes the Tribal Law and Order 
Act (“TLOA”) made to American Indian criminal jurisdiction and why Alaska 
was largely exempted.103 Section B looks at the most recent reauthorization of 
                                                                                                                           
cases involving alcohol. See id. at 7; see also NEIL NESHEIM, EVALUATING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN 
ALASKA: THE KAKE CIRCLE 41 (2010). Alaska Native tribal courts are considered effective at com-
bating social ills, partially because they “do so in more culturally sensitive ways than State courts.” 
Geoffry Wildridge, Access to Justice: The Continuing Debate over the Role of Tribal Courts in Rural 
Alaska, ALASKA B. RAG 3 (Apr.–July 2014). 
 98 See State of the Judiciary, supra note 9, at 11 (emphasizing the ability of parties in civil cases 
to engage in “local dispute resolution” through tribal courts). Research on restorative justice is limited, 
but generally points to lower rates of recidivism. See NESHEIM, supra note 97, at 31–32. 
 99 See, e.g., CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 440 (explaining instances where the Alaska Su-
preme Court has allowed for an expanded use of tribal courts in the wake of Venetie, primarily child 
custody cases); Strommer & Osborne, supra note 94, at 8–10 (noting that tribal jurisdiction is limited in 
Alaska to tribal membership, which has been articulated by the Alaska Supreme Court); Suzanna Cald-
well, Tanana Moves to Banish Two Residents in the Wake of Trooper Shooting, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, May 8, 2014, http://www.adn.com/article/20140508/tanana-moves-banish-two-residents-wake-
trooper-shooting, archived at http://perma.cc/4Q7V-WKRM (reporting on an attempt to banish two 
members from an Alaska Native village after two Alaska State Troopers were shot and killed). But see In 
re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849, 851, 852 n.9 (Alaska 2001) (holding that “P.L. 280 does not apply to those Alas-
ka Native tribes that do not occupy Indian country”). 
 100 See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act (VAWA) of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 
Stat. 54 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, 25, and 42 U.S.C.); Tribal Law and Or-
der Act (TLOA) of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 25 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 101 See § 910, 127 Stat. at 126 (“In the State of Alaska, the amendments made . . . shall only apply 
to the Indian country . . . of the Metlakatla Indian Community . . . .”); § 205, 124 Stat. at 2264 (“Noth-
ing in this Act limits, alters, expands, or diminishes the civil or criminal jurisdiction of the State of 
Alaska, any subdivision of the State of Alaska, or any Indian tribe in that State.”). 
 102 See Alaska Safe Families and Villages Act, S. 1474, 113th Cong. (2013); ROADMAP, supra note 
5, at 33 (calling Alaska’s recent exemption from the VAWA “unconscionable”); Natalie Landreth, Edito-
rial, Alaska Native Women Lose in Violence Against Women Act Renewal, ALASKA DISPATCH, Mar. 12, 
2013, http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20130312/alaska-native-women-lose-violence-against-
women-act-renewal, archived at http://perma.cc/QZ5K-AQ6V (criticizing Alaska’s exemption from the 
reauthorization of the VAWA). 
 103 See infra notes 107–118 and accompanying text. 
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the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act (“VAWA”) and explains why 
Alaska Natives do not benefit from many protections it provides.104 Section C 
explains some of the underlying opposition from both Congress and the State of 
Alaska to expanding Alaska Native tribal sovereignty.105 Finally, Section D re-
views proposed legislation in the U.S. Senate (the Alaska Safe Families and Vil-
lages Act), and explains its genesis, intent, and possible impacts on Alaska Na-
tives.106 
A. Strengthening Tribal Courts: The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 
With much fanfare, President Barack Obama signed the Tribal Law and 
Order Act of 2010 on July 29, 2010.107 Flanked by Native American leaders and 
victims of sexual assault on reservations, the President declared that this piece of 
legislation would help bring justice to Native American reservations.108 Among 
other things, the TLOA expanded tribal criminal jurisdiction on reservations and 
increased the maximum penalties that a tribal court can impose.109 The TLOA 
                                                                                                                           
 104 See infra notes 119–125 and accompanying text. 
 105 See infra notes 126–149 and accompanying text. 
 106 See infra notes 150–159 and accompanying text. 
 107 See Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA) of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261; Jodi 
Gillette, President Signs Tribal Law and Order Act, OFF. PUB. ENGAGEMENT BLOG, (July 30, 2010, 
06:34 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/07/30/president-signs-tribal-law-and-order-act, 
archived at http://perma.cc/XKY3-LK69; Rob Capriccioso, Do Congress and Obama Really Support 
the Tribal Law and Order Act?, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK, Dec. 19, 2011, http://
indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/12/19/do-congress-and-obama-really-support-tribal-law-
and-order-act-68002, archived at http://perma.cc/FHX6-YSPK. 
 108 See Gillette, supra note 107; Signing of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, WHITE
HOUSE.GOV (July 29, 2010) [hereinafter Signing of the TLOA], http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
2010/07/29/tribal-law-and-order-act-2010-a-step-forward-native-women, archived at http://perma.
cc/8W9F-S9Z8. Legal scholars have criticized the TLOA for not going far enough. See, e.g., Gideon 
M. Hart, A Crisis in Indian Country: An Analysis of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, 23 RE-
GENT U. L. REV. 139, 176–84 (2011) (critiquing the TLOA and proposing legislation that could im-
prove it); David Patton, Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010: Breathing Life into the Miner’s Canary, 
47 GONZ. L. REV. 767, 798–800 (2012) (arguing that the TLOA does not go far enough toward help-
ing Native Americans); Jasmine Owens, Comment, “Historic” in a Bad Way: How the Tribal Law 
and Order Act Continues the American Tradition of Providing Inadequate Protection to American 
Indian and Alaska Native Rape Victims, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 521–24 (2012) (pro-
posing changes to increase the effectiveness of the TLOA). 
 109 See § 234, 124 Stat. at 2279–80 (increasing maximum penalties for tribal courts to impose, 
upping the maximum sentence of incarceration from one to three years per offense and increasing the 
maximum criminal fine from $5,000 to $15,000); Gregory S. Arnold, Tribal Law and Order Act and 
Violence Against Women Act: Enhanced Recognition of Inherent Tribal Sovereignty Creates Greater 
Need for Criminal Defense Counsel in Indian Country, 61 FED. LAW. 4, 4 (Feb. 2014) (noting that as 
of October 2013, two tribal courts “have already sentenced a defendant to prison for a term in excess 
of one year”); Michael J. Bulzomi, Indian Country and the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, FBI L. 
ENFORCEMENT BULL. (May 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-
bulletin/may-2012/indian-country-and-the-tribal-law-and-order-act-of-2010, archived at http://perma.
cc/UKJ4-FU4R. But cf. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-658R, TRIBAL LAW AND 
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also increased funding for federal prosecutions on reservation land, improved 
channels of communication between federal and tribal governments, and created 
the Indian Law and Order Commission (“ILOC”) to publish a comprehensive 
report on crime and justice throughout the United States.110 
Despite the fact that a large percentage of the United States’ indigenous 
population resides in Alaska and an Alaskan U.S. Senator co-sponsored the 
TLOA, the congressional delegation from Alaska was conspicuously absent 
from the signing ceremony.111 This is because the TLOA explicitly exempted 
Alaska from the legislation.112 Although Alaska’s entire congressional delegation 
sat on the relevant committees for the bill, the only parts of the bill that impacted 
Alaska were small components inserted as amendments by Alaska’s U.S. Sena-
tor Lisa Murkowski.113 Although these sections provide increased funding to 
address crime in Alaska Native villages, the exemption from the main provisions 
of the bill indicates that Alaska Natives did not significantly benefit from the 
TLOA.114 
To date, no legal scholarship specifically addresses why the TLOA exempts 
Alaska.115 The most likely reason is that, since Alaska Native tribal courts cur-
rently do not have any criminal jurisdiction, including Alaska in the substantive 
portions of the TLOA would potentially create huge changes in the scope of 
                                                                                                                           
ORDER ACT, 3 (2012) (finding that as of May 2012, no tribal court had exercised the “TLOA’s new 
sentencing authority,” and cited the problem as a lack of funding). 
 110 See § 205, 124 Stat. at 2264–2301; Bulzomi, supra note 109. But see Capriccioso, supra note 
107 (lamenting the impact of congressional budget cuts on the efficacy of the TLOA). 
 111 See Signing of the TLOA, supra note 108; 156 CONG. REC. S5324 (daily ed. June 23, 2010) 
(adding Alaska Senator Mark Begich as a co-sponsor of the TLOA). 
 112 See § 205, 124 Stat. at 2264 (“Nothing in this Act limits, alters, expands, or diminishes the 
civil or criminal jurisdiction of the State of Alaska, any subdivision of the State of Alaska, or any 
Indian tribe in that State.”). 
 113 See S. REP. NO. 111-93, at 6 (2009) (noting that Senator Murkowski offered two amendments 
that were accepted through a unanimous voice vote “to address concerns relating specifically to Alas-
ka Native Villages”). 
 114 See § 205, 124 Stat. at 2264. However, some components of the TLOA do impact Alaska 
Natives in a limited fashion. See § 235, 124 Stat. at 2282; § 247, 124 Stat. at 2296–97; § 266, 124 
Stat. at 2301. The TLOA created the ILOC, which wrote an entire chapter detailing the status of tribal 
justice in Alaska along with recommendations on how to improve it. See § 235, 124 Stat. at 2282–86; 
ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 33. The TLOA also directed the Comptroller General of the United States 
to conduct a study about enforcement response capabilities for sexual assault and domestic violence 
claims from Alaska Native villages. See § 266, 124 Stat. at 2301 (directing the Comptroller General to 
conduct the study for both Alaska Native villages and “remote Indian reservations”). Finally, the 
TLOA also allows Alaska Native communities to apply for funding to help support Village Public 
Safety Officers (“VPSOs”). See § 247, 124 Stat. at 2296–97. The TLOA also allows VPSOs to partic-
ipate in training programs “at the Indian Police Academy of the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center.” See § 247(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 2297. 
 115 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 108, at 162–76 (discussing the TLOA and failing to explain the 
exemption); Patton, supra note 108, at 795 (mentioning Alaska only once with regard to the TLOA); 
Owens, supra note 108, at 510–13 (discussing practical problems with law enforcement for Native 
Americans and Alaska Natives without taking Alaska’s unique jurisdictional framework into account). 
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Alaska Native tribal sovereignty.116 Congress likely did not want to spend the 
time required to examine the myriad issues associated with an expansion of 
Alaska Native tribal jurisdiction.117 Additionally, concerns about the lack of 
Constitutional protections for defendants make it politically difficult to change 
Alaska Native criminal jurisdiction.118 
B. Protecting the Most Vulnerable: The Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013 
On the heels of an expansion of tribal jurisdiction with the TLOA, in 2013, 
as part of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act,119 Congress includ-
ed provisions that allowed prosecution of non-Native Americans in tribal courts 
for domestic violence and sexual assault.120 During negotiations regarding the 
adoption of the VAWA, opponents’ main fear was that defendants in these cases 
would not be afforded full constitutional protections and would not be able to 
appeal to federal court.121 These controversial provisions are poised to go into 
full effect on March 7, 2015.122 
At the request of Senator Murkowski in an amendment on the floor of the 
U.S. Senate, however, the reauthorization for the VAWA does not apply to Alas-
ka.123 Similar to the TLOA, the legislation contains explicit language saying that 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 523 (1998) (holding that 
ANCSA lands are not Indian country). 
 117 See MITCHELL, SOLD AMERICAN, supra note 34, at 13–14 (positing that the major congres-
sional roadblocks concerning Alaska Natives are ignorance and apathy). 
 118 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 51–52 (1978) (holding that alleged viola-
tions based on the Indian Civil Rights Act cannot be heard in federal court); Telephone Interview with 
Donald Craig Mitchell, supra note 90 (pointing out that there is no habeas corpus remedy in federal 
court if a tribal court violates constitutional protections). 
 119 See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act (VAWA) of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 
Stat. 54 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, 25, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 120 See Johnathan Weisman, Measure to Protect Women Stuck on Tribal Land Issue, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 11, 2013, at A11. This portion of the VAWA will likely get around the U.S. Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), that prevents Native Americans from 
criminally prosecuting non-Indian defendants who are charged with committing crimes in Indian country. 
See Laura C. Sayler, Note, Back to Basics: Special Domestic Violence Jurisdiction in the Violence 
Against Women Reactivation Act of 2013 and the Expansion of Inherent Tribal Sovereignty, 2014 
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 1, 13, http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/SAYLER_
2014_1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Q4EK-Z4TG. Funding for the Violence Against Women Act 
exists only when Congress reauthorizes it every five years. See id. at 10 n.48. 
 121 See Weisman, supra note 120 (explaining that a majority of the opposition came from con-
servative Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives). 
 122 See Sayler, supra note 120, at 6. There has been little criticism of the VAWA nationally be-
cause this controversial component has not yet taken full effect and it is still early for legal scholarship 
to become generated. See id. 
 123 See 159 CONG. REC. S598, S611–12 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2013) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Har-
vard Law Review Ass’n, Indian Law—Tribal Courts—Congress Recognizes and Affirms Tribal 
Courts' Special Domestic Violence Jurisdiction over Non-Indian Defendants.—the Violence Against 
Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1509, 1511 n.23 (charac-
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its passage should not be construed to change the Alaska Native sovereignty or 
jurisdiction within Alaska.124 Again, the majority of the legislation applies to 
Indian country, which the U.S. Supreme Court previously determined does not 
exist in Alaska.125 
C. Left Out in the Cold: Roadblocks to Reform 
Despite Congress’s plenary power, there are a number of factors making it 
difficult for Congress to pass legislation to assist Alaska Natives.126 First, given 
Alaska’s distance and isolation from Washington D.C., and the fact that Alaska’s 
congressional delegation is very small, there is a profound lack of first-hand 
knowledge among congressional members about the reality of tribal jurisdiction 
in Alaska.127 Second, there may be some hesitation by members of Congress to 
enact sweeping reforms regarding Alaska Native tribal sovereignty given the 
long history of continued lobbying and reforms after enacting major legisla-
tion.128 Moreover, today’s Congress has been rendered immobile by partisan-
                                                                                                                           
terizing Alaska’s exemption as inexplicable); Sari Horwitz, Senator from Alaska Reverses Her Divi-
sive Stance on Women’s Law, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2014, at A11 (characterizing this “Alaska excep-
tion” as previously having bipartisan support in 2012). The exemption for Alaska generated a vocal 
response. See ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 33 (calling the exemption “unconscionable”); Landreth, 
supra note 102 (hypothesizing that Senator Murkowski put in the exemption at the request of the 
Alaska Attorney General’s office in spite of constant Alaska Native lobbying efforts opposing the 
exclusion). Senator Murkowski appears to have changed her position. See Horwitz, supra (noting that 
Murkowski has reversed “her position and [is now] trying to repeal the provision she inserted”). 
 124 See § 910, 127 Stat. at 126 (“In the State of Alaska, the amendments made . . . shall only apply 
to the Indian country . . . of the Metlakatla Indian Community . . . .”). 
 125 See VAWA, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013); Venetie, 522 U.S. at 532. But see 
Landreth, supra note 102 (arguing that the portions of the VAWA for which Alaska was exempt 
would have given tribal courts in Alaska additional authority to issue protective orders in domestic 
violence and sexual assault cases). One portion of the VAWA does explicitly apply to Alaska, direct-
ing the Attorney General to report to Congress within one year with recommendations on whether to 
re-fund the Alaska Rural Justice and Law Enforcement Commission. See § 909, 127 Stat. at 126. The 
Alaska Rural Justice and Law Enforcement Commission, established in 2004, was seen as “a catalyst” 
for making the VPSO program more effective. See Alex DeMarban, Does Alaska’s Rural Justice 
Commission Have a Future?, ALASKA DISPATCH, Feb. 19, 2012, http://www.alaskadispatch.com/
article/does-alaskas-rural-justice-commission-have-future, archived at http://perma.cc/GRA8-G2H2. 
 126 See Rob Capriccioso, Sen. Begich Speaks Out on Indian & Alaska Native Concerns, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK, Feb. 26, 2014, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/
2014/02/26/sen-begich-speaks-out-indian-alaska-native-concerns-153747, archived at http://perma.
cc/6GDA-DJ3P (lamenting how the congressional process can get in the way of reform). 
 127 MITCHELL, SOLD AMERICAN, supra note 34, at 13 (recounting how former Alaska U.S. Sena-
tor Ted Stevens identified Alaska Natives’ biggest challenge in Congress as overcoming ignorance 
and apathy). 
 128 See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18, at 165 (noting that ANCSA has been modified almost 
every year since its enactment in 1971). 
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ship, with resulting gridlock and rampant criticism over the imperfect nature of 
any legislation that requires compromise.129 
In contrast, some recent developments signal the possibility of future con-
gressional action towards Alaska Natives.130 First, Alaska’s entire congressional 
delegation sits on the relevant committees in both the House and Senate.131 Sec-
ond, the ILOC, created by the TLOA, devoted an entire chapter to Alaska in its 
mandated report to Congress.132 This chapter identifies five ways for Congress 
to help Alaska Native villages, generally recommending a legislative expansion 
of Indian country to include Alaska.133 Hearings about the ILOC’s report have 
generated renewed congressional focus on the issue, with Senator Begich calling 
for hearings to see how Congress should react, specifically to the ILOC’s chapter 
on Alaska.134 Despite the increased focus on Alaska Native tribal sovereignty, 
however, reforms remain stalled in the U.S. Senate, and with so many demands 
on congressional time, it is hard to imagine that Congress will grant additional 
Alaska Native tribal sovereignty in the near future.135  
                                                                                                                           
 129 See Dan Friedman, Gridlock in Congress Expected to Worsen with Midterm Elections Loom-
ing, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 5, 2014, http://nydn.us/1lHZChJ, archived at http://perma.cc/4S8A-
W8QA (noting that Congress enacted the lowest number of laws in 2013 (fifty-eight) since Congress 
began counting in the 1940s). 
 130 See Capriccioso, supra note 126 (expressing optimism at the prospect of enacting legislation); 
Richard Mauer, What Now for Law & Order Panel’s Report?, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Dec. 8, 
2013, at A1 (highlighting the recent pressure on political leaders to change the jurisdictional frame-
work for Alaska Native tribal courts). 
 131 See 113th Congress Committees, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.gov/
committees/, archived at http://perma.cc/NYB2-CL3D (last visited Sept. 8, 2014) (listing Alaska Repre-
sentative Don Young as a member of the Natural Resources committee); 113th Congress Committee 
Assignments, U.S. SENATE https://www.senate.gov/general/committee_assignments/assignments.htm, 
archived at http://perma.cc/B4F9-TTUZ (last visited Sept. 8, 2014) (listing both Senators Mark Begich 
and Lisa Murkowski as members of the Committee on Indian Affairs). 
 132 See Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA) of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261 (estab-
lishing the ILOC). Section 235(f) of the TLOA requires that the ILOC publish a report to Congress 
and the President, and section 235(d)(5) allows the ILOC to investigate “other subjects as the Com-
mission determines relevant.” See § 235, 124 Stat. at 2284. Part of the ILOC’s success in Alaska is 
from all of the positive press coverage generated in local newspapers. See Mauer, supra note 33; 
Mauer, supra note 8; Mauer, supra note 130. But see TLOA, § 235(l), 124 Stat. at 2286 (terminating 
the ILOC “90 days after . . . the report”). 
 133 See ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 51–53, 55. This includes a recommendation that Congress 
“affirm the inherent criminal jurisdiction of Alaska Native Tribal governments over their members 
within the external boundaries of their villages.” See id. at 55. 
 134 See Capriccioso, supra note 126; Press Release, U.S. Senator Mark Begich, supra note 10. 
 135 See Capriccioso, supra note 126 (emphasizing congressional roadblocks); Mike Mason, 
“Alaska Safe Families and Villages Act of 2014” Ready for a Vote in the Senate, KDLG (May 22, 
2014), http://kdlg.org/post/alaska-safe-familes-and-villages-act-2014-ready-vote-senate, archived at 
http://perma.cc/F4UD-VLEH (reporting that the Alaska Safe Families and Villages Act in its current 
form is awaiting a vote in the Senate); Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Congress Off for the 
Exits, but Few Cheer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2014, at A2 (characterizing the 113th Congress as being 
“in a race to the bottom . . . for the ‘do nothing’ crown”). Furthermore, if Senator Begich is not re-
elected in November, it could become significantly more difficult for Alaska Native tribal sovereignty 
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Jurisdictional reforms also face significant problems with the State of Alas-
ka itself.136 Since the beginning of the Alaska Native tribal sovereignty move-
ment, the State of Alaska has actively opposed efforts to expand Alaska Native 
tribal jurisdiction through litigation and administrative actions.137 This general 
policy against the expansion of Alaska Native tribal sovereignty continues, as the 
State maintains a strong disapproval of the ILOC’s findings on Alaska.138 
The State of Alaska opposes granting Alaska Natives additional tribal sov-
ereignty for five general reasons.139 First, the State argues that Alaska has a 
much different history than that of Native Americans in the rest of the United 
States, and that Alaska Natives forfeited much of their tribal sovereignty when 
they agreed to the terms of ANCSA.140 Second, various administrations have 
struggled with defining the territorial scope of Alaska Native tribal jurisdiction in 
the wake of the Venetie decision which declared that Indian country does not 
                                                                                                                           
advocates to gain traction in Congress. See Heather Kendall-Miller & Lloyd Miller, Op-Ed., Examin-
ing Sullivan’s and Begich’s Record on Alaska Native Issues, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS, Aug. 31, 
2014, available at http://www.adn.com/article/20140831/examining-sullivans-and-begichs-records-
alaska-native-issues, archived at http://perma.cc/8K8B-XAGP (characterizing Dan Sullivan, Senator 
Begich’s challenger in November, as being “a staunch opponent of Native rights”). But cf. Lisa 
Reimers et al., Op-Ed., Alaska’s Problems Shouldn’t Be Exploited for Political Gain, ALASKA DIS-
PATCH NEWS, Sept. 7, 2014, available at http://www.adn.com/article/20140907/alaskas-problems-
shouldnt-be-exploited-political-gain, archived at http://perma.cc/48CM-ZCMB (countering that Dan 
Sullivan has done a lot for public safety in rural Alaska). 
 136 See, e.g, ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 233–47 (outlining the State of Alaska’s opposition to the 
ILOC’s conclusions); Mauer, Natives Protest Parnell’s Decision, supra note 11 (highlighting the 
State of Alaska’s petition for writ of certiorari in a subsistence case); Mauer, State Goes to Bat for 
Rights of Convicted Wife-Beater, supra note 11 (explaining the State of Alaska’s opposition to a tribal 
court terminating a non-member’s parental rights). 
 137 See, e.g., Mauer, State Goes to Bat for Rights of Convicted Wife-Beater, supra note 11 (high-
lighting the State’s opposition to a tribal court terminating a non-member’s parental rights); Mitchell, 
Why History Counts, supra note 34, at 392–93 (describing the State of Alaska’s initial response to the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs’ attempt to issue tribal constitutions); Wildridge, supra note 97, at 3 (noting 
that the scope of Alaska Native sovereignty has “been the subject of legal challenges by the State of 
Alaska for many years”). But see Di Pietro, supra note 72, at 342 (recalling that Governor Cowper’s 
administration did not oppose the expansion of tribal sovereignty). 
 138 See ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 233–47 (articulating the State of Alaska’s opposition to the 
ILOC’s conclusions). 
 139 See id. In a way, the State of Alaska’s position of sticking with a centralized form of justice 
runs counter to the libertarian rhetoric and sentiment to which many citizens of Alaska relate. See 
Steve Haycox, Op-Ed., U.S. Exceptional in Its Stand on Rights, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 20, 
2013, at A10; Michael Powell, Leery of Washington, Alaska Feasts on its Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
18, 2010, at A1 (discussing Alaskan’s general distain for the federal government, despite receiving the 
most federal dollars per capita). This seems inconsistent with the ILOC’s chapter on Alaska, which 
reports that one of the major problems with the administration of justice in Alaska Native villages is 
the over-centralization of the system and an inability to cover an area so large and sparsely populated. 
See ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 35, 43–47, 49 (concluding that Alaska’s centralized administration of 
justice “falls short of local needs”). 
 140 See ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 234–36. 
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exist in the vast majority of Alaska.141 Third, if Alaska Natives were recognized 
as tribal sovereigns with some form of territorial reach, the State is concerned 
that it “would create a confusing patchwork quilt of jurisdiction.”142 Fourth, the 
State has an underlying concern about the lack of constitutional protections that 
would be afforded to defendants subject to tribal court jurisdiction.143 Finally, the 
State believes that the current scope of Alaska Native tribal sovereignty, such as 
the ability to adjudicate child custody cases, is sufficient when coupled with the 
State’s recent efforts to address rural problems.144 
Despite these justifications, the combination of a number of high profile 
court cases and the ILOC report has put some political pressure on Alaska’s 
Governor to grant greater autonomy to Alaska Native tribal courts.145 Although 
the State continues to oppose Alaska Native tribal jurisdiction in some cases, the 
Attorney General for the State of Alaska appears to have been at least partially 
influenced by the ILOC, and has been working with Alaska Native leaders on 
ways to expand their tribal authority.146  
                                                                                                                           
 141 See id. at 239–40 (explaining the confusion that would likely ensue by not knowing which 
jurisdiction a person in an Alaska Native village would be subject to). 
 142 See id. But see Oneida Tribe v. Village of Hobart, 732 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2013) (charac-
terizing overlapping jurisdictions as “a familiar feature of American government”). 
 143 See Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012) (providing some constitutional 
rights to defendants in tribal courts); Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 51–52 (holding that alleged 
violations based on the ICRA cannot be heard in federal court); Michael C. Geraghty, Point: Tribal 
Courts, State Perspectives by Alaska Attorney General Michael C. Geraghty, ALASKA B. RAG 3 
(Apr.–June 2014) (arguing that it would be “unfair to subject an Alaskan to the jurisdiction of a tribal 
government that she has no right to participate in”); Mauer, State Goes to Bat for Rights of Convicted 
Wife-Beater, supra note 11 (noting that some constitutional protections, like the right to an attorney in 
court, are not constitutionally protected in tribal courts); Telephone Interview with Donald Craig 
Mitchell, supra note 90 (opining that congressional drafters did not construct the ICRA correctly, and 
as such there is no remedy for constitutional violations in tribal courts). 
 144 See ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 241–47. For example, both the ILOC and the State of Alaska 
agree that Alaska’s recent enactment of legislation to arm VPSOs is a positive development. See id. at 
37, 39 (criticizing the VPSO program for officers’ inability to carry firearms); Kyle Hopkins, Firearm 
Training for VPSOs Could Begin in January; Some Villages May Opt Out, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS, 
July 30, 2014, http://www.adn.com/article/20140730/firearm-training-vpsos-could-begin-january-
some-villages-may-opt-out, archived at http://perma.cc/X8VV-UWFQ (reporting that Governor Par-
nell signed legislation to arm VPSOs on July 18, 2014). VPSOs are found in many Alaska Native 
villages, are funded by Alaska Native Regional Corporations and the State of Alaska, report directly 
to the Alaska State Troopers, and are available as “basic law enforcement and emergency first re-
sponse.” See About VPSO Program, ALASKA DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY (last visited Sept. 8, 2014), 
http://dps.alaska.gov/ast/vpso/about.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/NKJ2-GJ2B; ROADMAP, supra 
note 5, at 39; Troy A. Eid, Book Review: Alaska Natives and American Laws, 30 ALASKA L. REV. 
223, 229 (2013) (reviewing CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 18); Andre Rosay et al., A Brief Look at 
VPSOs and Violence Against Women Cases, 28 ALASKA JUST. F., no. 2–3, Summer/Fall 2011, at 10, 
10 (emphasizing the “essential” role VPSOs play in rural Alaska Native communities). 
 145 See Mauer, Natives Protest Parnell’s Decision, supra note 11; Mauer, supra note 8; Mauer, 
State Goes to Bat for Rights of Convicted Wife-Beater, supra note 11. 
 146 See KTUU, supra note 12 (reporting that the State of Alaska will allow certain types of mis-
demeanors to be prosecuted in some tribal courts on a voluntary basis without prison sentences); see 
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Yet even with these recent developments, many remain skeptical that the 
State of Alaska will initiate or succeed at creating changes to Alaska Native trib-
al jurisdiction in a way that will substantially grant additional tribal sovereignty 
to Alaska Natives.147 So far, announcements by Governor Sean Parnell and 
agreements with Alaska Native communities have been limited in scope.148 Fur-
thermore, even with small positive changes, as there have been before, the next 
administration or Attorney General could easily reverse course, which empha-
sizes Congress’s unique role in expanding Alaska Native tribal sovereignty.149 
D. A Step in the Right Direction: The Alaska Safe Families and Villages Act 
Despite these roadblocks in Congress and Alaska, there is potential for pos-
itive change on the federal level.150 On August 1, 2013, Alaska’s two U.S. Sena-
                                                                                                                           
also Geraghty, supra note 143, at 3, 5 (recognizing “tribal courts and tribal governments as essential 
partners in improving public safety and increasing access to justice in rural Alaska” and declaring that 
“the State wants to collaborate”). 
 147 See Mauer, supra note 33 (reporting that Alaska State House members are not “sure what they 
could do” in response to the ILOC’s Report). Alaska Governor Sean Parnell did not mention Alaska 
Natives once in his most recent State of the State address. See Governor Sean Parnell, State of the 
State Address (Jan. 22, 2014), available at http://gov.alaska.gov/parnell/press-room/full-press-
release.html?pr=6713. 
 148 See Hopkins, supra note 12. 
 149 See HAYCOX, supra note 23, at 156–57 (recounting when Governor Knowles considered ex-
panding Alaska Native tribal sovereignty); Di Pietro, supra note 72, at 342 (noting the changes in 
State policy based on administration between Governors Cowper and Hickel). 
 150 See Capriccioso, supra note 126 (expressing optimism about the enactment of the Alaska Safe 
Families and Villages Act (“ASFVA”)); see also Mason, supra note 135 (reporting that the ASFVA 
can now be voted on by the full Senate). There has also been a recent burst of optimism from pro-
posed regulations by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to allow Alaska Natives to apply for their tribal 
lands to be put into trust. See Richard Mauer, Interior Rules Would Create “Indian country” in Alas-
ka, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 1, 2014, at A1 (reporting that regulations, which would replace 
the existing ones from 1980, were proposed on April 30, 2014). Alaska Native tribal sovereignty ad-
vocates have applauded these new proposed regulations. See ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 52–53, 55 
(asking Congress to amend ANCSA to allow Alaska Natives to have lands placed into trust); Boraas, 
supra note 28 (arguing that trust designations for Alaska Natives would be a positive development and 
urging others to comment on the proposed regulations); Rob Capriccioso, Federal Policy Shift: Key 
Players Favor Alaska Tribal Trust Lands, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (May 12, 
2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/05/12/federal-policy-shift-key-players-
favor-alaska-tribal-trust-lands-154829?page=0%2C0, archived at http://perma.cc/UA3E-WX8U (not-
ing that “[t]ribal reactions have been widely supportive”). However, the proposed regulations are 
unlikely to lead to any significant changes, if there is any change at all, in the next few years. See 
Mary Bishop, Issues Unresolved in Proposal for Alaska Native Land in Federal Trust, ALASKA DIS-
PATCH, June 25, 2014, http://www.adn.com/article/20140625/issues-unresolved-proposal-alaska-
native-land-federal-trust, archived at http://perma.cc/T9Y2-GMV4 (arguing against the proposed 
regulations); Capriccioso, supra (recognizing that any changes from the proposed regulations are 
unlikely to happen quickly). Future courts will have to reconcile these new regulations with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Venetie, which appeared to have left the issue for Congress. See Venetie, 
522 U.S. at 534 (“Whether the concept of Indian country should be modified is a question entirely for 
Congress.”). 
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tors jointly introduced Senate Bill 1474, also known as the Alaska Safe Families 
and Villages Act (“ASFVA”).151 The Act’s stated goal is to grant law enforce-
ment opportunities to tribal courts in Alaska and improve the situation for Alaska 
Natives in rural Alaska through a pilot program coordinated by the State of 
Alaska.152 The goal of the ASFVA is to empower Alaska Native villages to fight 
basic alcohol abuse and domestic violence issues in places where there is cur-
rently no law enforcement presence.153 The ASFVA would provide Alaska Na-
tive villages with authority to negotiate with the State of Alaska to obtain this 
form of limited jurisdiction.154 Section 6 of the ASFVA also repeals the Alaska 
exemption in the VAWA 2013 reauthorization.155 
This is not the first time that Senator Begich has introduced the ASFVA, but 
it is the first time both of Alaska’s U.S. Senators have co-sponsored the legisla-
tion.156 This version of the bill is different from previous versions in two main 
ways.157 First, in previous versions, instead of the State of Alaska administering 
and coordinating the pilot programs, the Federal Government would take the 
lead.158 Second, there was a funding component included in the previous legisla-
tion that is absent from the current version of the ASFVA.159  
III. REVERSING THE HISTORY OF NEGLECT: PROACTIVE SOLUTIONS FOR 
EXPANDING ALASKA NATIVE TRIBAL JURISDICTIONAL 
Since 1867, Congress, the judiciary, and Alaska’s governments have grap-
pled with Alaska Native sovereignty.160 All three entities play an important role 
                                                                                                                           
 151 See Alaska Safe Families and Villages Act, S. 1474, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 152 Id. 
 153 See Carey Restino, Federal Bill Takes Aim at Drug, Alcohol-Fueled Ills of Rural Alaska, 
ALASKA DISPATCH, Aug. 16, 2013, http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20130816/federal-bill-
takes-aim-drug-alcohol-fueled-ills-rural-alaska, archived at http://perma.cc/C2HT-HH9F. One of the 
persistent problems with justice and safety in rural Alaska is the centralized aspect of law enforce-
ment, which is difficult to administer when many communities live off of the road system. See 
ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 35 (criticizing the centralized administration of justice in Alaska). 
 154 See S. 1474, § 4. 
 155 See id. at § 6. 
 156 See Alaska Safe Families and Villages Act of 2011, S. 1192, 112th Cong. (2011); Alaska Safe 
Families and Villages Act of 2010, S. 3740, 111th Cong. (2010). 
157 Compare S. 1474, § 4 (2013) (directing the Attorney General to make grants with Alaska Native 
villages to allow them to work with the State of Alaska), with S. 1192, § 4 (directing the Department 
of Justice to carry out the program with up to nine Alaska Native villages), and S. 3740, § 4 (same). 
 158 See Capriccioso, supra note 126 (explaining that the language had to be softened to get Sena-
tor Murkowski on board as a co-sponsor). 
159 Compare S. 1474, § 5 (2013) (omitting any specific appropriation amount), with S. 1192, § 6(c) 
(appropriating two million dollars to the pilot program), and S. 3740, § 6(c) (same). 
 160 See Treaty with Russia, U.S.-Russ., art. 3, Mar. 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539 (declining to extend 
U.S. citizenship to Alaska Natives at the time of the purchase, but instead subjecting them “to such 
laws and regulations as the United States may, from time to time, adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes 
of that country”); In re Sah Quah, 3 F. 327, 331 (D. Alaska 1886) (holding that Alaskan Natives did 
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in developing initiatives to increase tribal jurisdiction, and specific actions by 
any of these three entities could help remedy the difficulties faced by Alaskan 
Natives through their inaction.161 This Part proposes four ways to expand Alaska 
Native tribal sovereignty so that local communities can better combat alcohol 
abuse, domestic violence, and sexual assault.162 Section A proposes two congres-
sional actions to help Alaska Natives and address the difficult conditions found 
in many rural communities.163 Section B suggests that Alaska, independent of 
congressional efforts, should help Alaska Natives by allowing increased local 
control.164 Finally, Section C argues that the Alaska Supreme Court should ex-
pand on prior precedent and find Alaska Native inherent tribal sovereignty to 
include limited criminal jurisdiction over members.165 
A. Giving Power to the People: Congress Should Expand Alaska  
Native Tribal Sovereignty 
With its plenary power, congressional action regarding Alaska Native sov-
ereignty and tribal jurisdiction is the most effective at instituting change.166 Alt-
hough Congress has recently enacted two pieces of legislation that had potential 
to help Alaska Native communities, it failed to take advantage of this opportuni-
ty.167 By explicitly exempting Alaska Natives from the Tribal Law and Order Act 
of 2010 (“TLOA”) and the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act of 2013 (“VAWA”), Congress failed to address the unac-
ceptably high rates of domestic violence and abuse that plague Alaska Native 
communities.168 
                                                                                                                           
not have sovereignty); MITCHELL, SOLD AMERICANS, supra note 34, at 44 (characterizing Alaska’s 
early military government as positioned to fight Alaska Natives if needed). 
 161 See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (defending the “existing sovereign 
powers” of Native Americans); Capriccioso, supra note 126 (noting the roles of Congress and the 
State of Alaska). 
 162 See infra notes 166–244 and accompanying text. 
 163 See infra notes 166–212 and accompanying text. 
 164 See infra notes 213–228 and accompanying text. 
 165 See infra notes 229–244 and accompanying text. 
 166 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (holding that Congress’s Constitu-
tional powers with regard to Native Americans “are not limited by any restrictions”); see also Alaska 
v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 534 (1998) (recognizing that defining Alaska 
Native’s jurisdictional framework “is a question entirely for Congress”). 
 167 See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act (VAWA) of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 
Stat. 54 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, 25, and 42 U.S.C.); Tribal Law and Or-
der Act (TLOA) of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 25 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 168 See § 910, 127 Stat. at 126 (“In the State of Alaska, the amendments made . . . shall only apply 
to the Indian country . . . of the Metlakatla Indian Community . . . .”); § 205, 124 Stat. at 2264 (“Noth-
ing in this Act limits, alters, expands, or diminishes the civil or criminal jurisdiction of the State of 
Alaska, any subdivision of the State of Alaska, or any Indian tribe in that State.”). 
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Although Congress has yet to enacted legislation to help Alaska Native 
communities, Congress has a history of taking time to enact such sweeping leg-
islation.169 This Section argues that there are two reasonable actions that Con-
gress should take to give Alaska Native communities additional local control.170 
Subsection 1 argues that Congress should enact the Alaska Safe Families and 
Villages Act (“ASFVA”) as a first step towards giving Alaska Natives the tribal 
sovereignty they need to address social ills in their communities.171 Subsection 2 
advocates for the congressional enactment of a new kind of Indian country that 
gives Alaska Natives limited criminal jurisdiction over members within their 
rural communities.172 
1. Congress Should Enact the Alaska Safe Families and Villages Act and 
Repeal Section 910 of the VAWA 
The easiest way for Congress to give Alaska Natives more resources to 
combat some of the life-threatening social ills found in rural communities is to 
enact the ASFVA.173 Although the proposed legislation falls short in many re-
spects, it should be the first of many steps in the right direction.174 With biparti-
san co-sponsors from Alaska’s delegation, there may now be enough momentum 
in Congress to enact this legislation.175 
In its current form, ASFVA gives Alaska Native communities without any 
law enforcement presence the authority to negotiate with the State of Alaska to 
obtain the local control needed to combat alcohol abuse and domestic vio-
lence.176 Given the lawless reality in these communities where victims do not 
have anyone to turn to for help, this change has the potential to increase coopera-
                                                                                                                           
 169 See, e.g., MITCHELL, SOLD AMERICANS, supra note 34, at 377–78 (noting that an initial at-
tempt at an Alaska Native Settlement Act, eventually enacted in 1971, was made as early as 1946); 
Capriccioso, supra note 126 (discussing congressional difficulty in reversing the 2009 U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395–96 (2009), that held that the United States 
cannot place tribal lands into trust for tribes recognized after 1934). 
 170 See infra notes 173–212 and accompanying text. 
 171 See infra notes 173–193 and accompanying text. 
 172 See infra notes 194–212 and accompanying text. 
 173 See Alaska Safe Families and Villages Act, S. 1474, 113th Cong. (2013); Mason, supra note 
135 (reporting that the ASFVA is out of committee and waiting for a vote in the Senate). 
 174 See Oversight Hearing to Receive Testimony on “The Indian Law and Order Commission 
Report: A Roadmap for Making Native America Safer” Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 113th 
Cong. (2014) [hereinafter Jerue Testimony], 3–4 (statement of Tami Truett Jerue, Tribal Administra-
tor and Director of Social Services, Anvik Tribal Council, Alaska), available at http://www.indian.
senate.gov/sites/default/files/upload/files/021214Tami%20Truett%20Jerue.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/EYD6-8EHX (urging that a previous, stronger version of S. 1474 replace the current ver-
sion); Capriccioso, supra note 126 (reporting that Senator Mark Begich, one of S. 1474’s primary 
sponsors, believes that the proposed legislation does not go far enough). 
 175 See Capriccioso, supra note 126 (expressing optimism of S. 1474’s passage now that it has 
bipartisan support). 
 176 Restino, supra note 153. 
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tion and communication between Alaska Native villages and the State of Alas-
ka.177 
Another key component of the ASFVA is the repeal of Alaska’s exemption 
in the VAWA.178 Alaska’s exemption in the VAWA, found in Section 910 of the 
enacted legislation, engendered a great deal of criticism in Alaska and national-
ly.179 This may partially be explained by how the exemption became part of the 
legislation through an amendment offered by Alaska U.S. Senator Lisa Murkow-
ski.180 Furthermore, the criticism also stems from the fact that without the ex-
emption, Alaska Native tribal courts may have otherwise been able to issue civil 
protection orders and “use other appropriate mechanisms” to protect victims 
from perpetrators in Alaska Native communities.181 However the repeal of Sec-
tion 910 from the VAWA happens, such an action is the easiest way for Congress 
to have an immediate impact on Alaska Native communities.182 
Still, there are many shortcomings to the ASFVA.183 For instance, the 
ASFVA would only encourage Alaska Native communities to partner with the 
State of Alaska, where the State would retain full discretion and could choose 
                                                                                                                           
 177 See S. 1474, § 4 (requiring cooperation between Alaska Native communities and the State of 
Alaska); John D. Sutter, The Lawless ‘End of the Land,’ CNN (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.cnn.
com/2014/02/03/opinion/sutter-alaska-rape-lawless/index.html?iid=article_sidebar, archived at http://
perma.cc/J8FB-ALSR (characterizing Nunam Iqua, an Alaska Native village without any law en-
forcement presence, as “lawless”). 
 178 See S. 1474, § 6 (“Section 910 of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 
. . . is repealed.”). 
 179 See, e.g., ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 33 (finding Senator Murkowski’s exclusion of Alaska 
from sections 904 and 905 of the VAWA “unconscionable”); Horwitz, supra note 123 (reporting on 
the pressure Senator Murkowski faced after her support for the Alaska exclusion); Landreth, supra 
note 102 (correcting statements from Senator Murkowski claiming that section 910 of the VAWA was 
an “inclusion” for Alaska). 
 180 Compare 159 CONG. REC. S611 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2013) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) 
(“[T]he distinguished Senator from Alaska, Ms. Murkowski, has filed amendment No. 11, a technical 
fix to ensure that VAWA’s tribal provisions apply to Alaska. I now offer the amendment on her be-
half.” (emphasis added)), with id. at S611–12 (exempting Alaska from Sections 904 and 905 of the 
VAWA, except for the one reservation in Alaska). 
 181 See VAWA, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 905, 127 Stat. 54, 124 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2265(e) (2013)) (“[A] court of an Indian tribe shall have full civil jurisdiction to issue and enforce 
protection orders . . . to exclude violators from Indian land, and to use other appropriate mechanisms, 
in matters arising anywhere in the Indian country . . . or otherwise within the authority of the Indian 
tribe.”); Landreth, supra note 102 (arguing that Section 905 of the VAWA would have given Alaska 
Native tribal courts the ability to issue and enforce civil protective orders). 
 182 See Jerue Testimony, supra note 174, at 3 (asking for the repeal of Section 910 of the VA-
WA); ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 33 (characterizing Section 910 of the VAWA as “unconscionable”); 
Landreth, supra note 102 (arguing that Alaska Native communities would benefit from the repeal of 
Section 910 of the VAWA). 
 183 See Jerue Testimony, supra note 174, at 2–4 (asking, as an amendment, that the ASFVA allow 
the Department of the Interior to place Alaska Native tribal lands into trust); Capriccioso, supra note 
126 (recognizing that the ASFVA could and should give federally recognized Alaska Native tribes 
jurisdiction over non-Indians for crimes of sexual assault and domestic violence). 
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not to participate.184 Given the State’s long-standing opposition to granting Alas-
ka Natives additional tribal sovereignty, the immediate impact of ASFVA’s en-
actment is difficult to predict.185 Additionally, because the proposed legislation 
would only create a pilot program, the status quo would become a default posi-
tion.186 Finally, unlike earlier versions of the ASFVA, there is no federal funding 
attached.187 This lack of funding may make the legislation’s changes prohibitive-
ly expensive for rural Alaska Native communities that cannot afford law en-
forcement in the first place.188 
Despite these shortcomings, Congress should enact the ASFVA.189 By ex-
empting Alaska from the TLOA and the VAWA, Congress failed to remedy the 
disproportionate rates of domestic violence and sexual assault found in Alaska 
Native villages.190 To combat this epidemic, Congress must enact legislation that 
specifically addresses these unique issues.191 Enacting the ASFVA would also 
give Congress an opportunity to assess the impact of the legislation.192 This 
could help Congress in the future to find solutions to combat social ills found in 
Alaska Native communities.193 
2. Congress Should Enact Legislation that Establishes a New Type of Indian 
Country in Alaska  
As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1998 in Alaska v. Native Village of 
Venetie Tribal Government, Congress has the unique ability to either expand the 
                                                                                                                           
 184 See Alaska Safe Families and Villages Act, S. 1474, 113th Cong., § 4 (2013) (“The State . . . 
and Indian tribes in the State are encouraged to enter into intergovernmental agreements relating to the 
enforcement of certain State laws by the Indian tribe.”). 
 185 See S. 1474, § 4 (declining to mandate partnerships between the State and Alaska Native 
communities). This possible lack of impact could be explained by the State’s position that the status 
quo is working. ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 241–47 (detailing actions the State of Alaska has taken 
that the administration deems as sufficient). 
 186 See S. 1474, § 4 (encouraging the State of Alaska to partner with Alaska Native communities). 
 187 Compare S. 1474, § 5 (omitting any specific appropriation amount), with S. 1192, § 6(c) 
(2011) (appropriating two million dollars to the pilot program), and Alaska Safe Families and Villages 
Act of 2010, S. 3740, 111th Cong. (2010) (same). 
 188 See Masters Testimony, supra note 7 (suggesting the difficulty of funding law enforcement in 
every rural Alaskan community). 
 189 See Capriccioso, supra note 126 (advocating for the Alaska Safe Families and Villages Act’s 
passage); Restino, supra note 153 (reporting that Alaska Natives are supportive of the proposed legis-
lation). 
 190 See Canfield, supra note 29 (characterizing rural Alaska’s safety as being “the worst in the 
United States”). 
 191 See Jerue Testimony, supra note 174, at 2–4 (urging Congress to give Alaska Natives “the 
tools necessary to combat drug and alcohol abuse, domestic violence, and violence against women”). 
 192 See S. 1474, § 4; cf. DeMarban, supra 125 (highlighting the role the Alaska Rural Justice and 
Law Enforcement Commission played in combating alcohol abuse in rural Alaska Native communi-
ties). 
 193 See Restino, supra note 154 (noting that the proposed legislation would promote collaboration 
between State and tribal governments). 
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definition of Indian country to include Alaska or create a different jurisdictional 
framework.194 Given Alaska’s unique background and the extinguishment of 
Indian country through the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”), 
Congress should establish a new tribal jurisdictional framework for Alaska.195 
This new definition could be added to the definition of Indian country found in 
18 U.S.C. § 1151, and could grant more limited rights to Alaska Natives in com-
parison to those enjoyed by other Native Americans.196 By doing so, Congress 
would have the ability to give Alaska Natives the level of tribal sovereignty 
needed to protect members from domestic violence and sexual assault while en-
suring that the constitutional protections of defendants remain intact.197 
Although Congress could simply extend Indian country to include ANCSA 
lands or even the entire State of Alaska, doing so would likely create a number 
of problems.198 In particular, some argue that Indian country as it existed in the 
contiguous United States never really existed in Alaska.199 Such an extension of 
Indian country would also create many more problems relating to sovereign im-
munity within Alaska and could have a serious impact on State and local tax 
revenues.200 Another concern is that defendants in tribal courts would be without 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See Venetie, 522 U.S. at 534 (“Whether the concept of Indian country should be modified 
[with regard to Alaska] is a question entirely for Congress.”). 
 195 See Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, § 4(b), 85 Stat. 688, 690 (1971) 
(codified in 43 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2006)) (extinguishing all aboriginal title); cf. ROADMAP, supra note 
5, at 51–53, 55 (urging congressional action to change the definition of Indian country in Alaska). 
 196 See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (defining Indian country as “land within the limits of any Indian 
reservation . . . all dependent Indian communities . . . [and] all Indian allotments”); Strommer & Os-
borne, supra note 94, at 33–34 (recommending changes to the definition of Indian country to apply to 
Alaska); cf. ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 234–36 (detailing how the State of Alaska distinguishes Alas-
ka Natives from Native Americans in their experience with Indian country). 
 197 See Hart, supra note 108, at 149 (“Many Native Americans must rely upon . . . prosecutors, 
who are often hundreds of miles away, to prosecute even minor crimes. Not surprisingly, this leaves 
many offenses, even very serious ones, unprosecuted.”); see also King, supra note 33, at 46–52 (rec-
ommending that Alaska Native communities be given prosecutorial powers over some criminal mat-
ters); Strommer & Osborne, supra note 94, at 29–33 (detailing some of the benefits of expanding 
tribal jurisdiction in Alaska). 
 198 See Venetie, 522 U.S. at 534 (emphasizing Congress’s role in defining the bounds of Indian 
Country in Alaska); ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 236 (demonstrating that the State forcefully objects to 
the creation of any additional Indian country in Alaska). But see ROADMAP, supra note 5, at 51–53, 55 
(recommending that Congress extend Indian country to parts of Alaska). One criticism of the ILOC is 
that no member of the committee is Alaskan. See id. at 191–97 (showing a lack of experience in Alas-
ka in all of the ILOC’s commissioner biographies). 
 199 See Sah Quah, 3 F. at 329 (holding that there is no Indian country in Alaska); ROADMAP, 
supra note 5, 234–36 (detailing the State’s argument that the unique history of Alaska had a much 
different relationship with Indian country than many Native Americans); Mitchell, Why History 
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recourse if their constitutional rights are violated in the adjudicatory process.201 
Finally, ANCSA was a settlement between Alaska Natives and Congress where 
“[a]ll aboriginal titles . . . [were] extinguished.”202 Especially given the active 
participation of Alaska Native leaders in drafting ANCSA, it might be difficult 
for Congress to grant additional protections and tribal sovereignty to Alaska Na-
tives after what has been viewed by many as a generous settlement.203 
Regardless of Congress’s opposition to extending Indian country to Alaska, 
expanding local control through a limited form of territorial jurisdiction for 
Alaska Natives would likely help communities confront serious problems with 
domestic violence and sexual assault.204 For example, the State of Alaska is con-
cerned with constitutional protections for defendants in Alaska Native tribal 
courts, especially since tribal courts in Alaska vary widely.205 To address this 
concern, Congress could grant appellate jurisdiction over tribal decisions to ei-
ther State or Federal courts.206 Congress could then give Alaska Natives concur-
rent jurisdiction over domestic violence and sexual assault cases, in a limited 
fashion similar to the authority Congress granted to American Indians in the rest 
of the country with the enactment of the TLOA and the VAWA.207 Additionally, 
Congress could limit the territorial scope of this new type of Indian country to 
Alaska Native town sites, which are more easily identifiable than some Indian 
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appeals process). 
 207 See Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA) of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234, 124 Stat. 2261, 
2279–80 (2010) (codified as amended in 25 U.S.C. § 1302) (increasing maximum penalties for tribal 
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country in the contiguous United States.208 Finally, congressional action could 
have a greater impact than ANCSA on Alaska Natives who live in rural commu-
nities today, due to birth rates and emigration from the villages.209  
Congress has the ultimate authority and obligation to protect Alaska Native 
citizens.210 And regardless of what Congress decides to do, the reality is that the 
status quo is not working.211 Therefore, Congress can and should give local con-
trol back to Alaska Native communities in a way that protects all Alaskans.212  
B. Supporting Local Government: The State of Alaska Should Grant 
Additional Authority to Alaska Native Tribal Courts to Combat  
Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault in Rural Alaska 
Although the State of Alaska may lack plenary powers with regard to Alas-
ka Natives, it is better positioned to find a long-term and meaningful solution to 
Alaska Native tribal jurisdictional issues than Congress.213 Alaska’s government 
is well-versed in the problems plaguing rural Alaska Native communities, and 
Alaskans would likely be less resentful of change if it came from the state rather 
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further congressional action). 
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than the federal government.214 Additionally, as a P.L. 280 state, Alaska has the 
jurisdictional authority to dictate the scope of Alaska Native tribal jurisdiction in 
the absence of congressional action.215  
The State of Alaska should help Alaska Natives combat domestic violence 
and sexual assault in rural Alaska by abandoning its broken centralized admin-
istration and rely more on localized tribal courts.216 As noted by the Indian Law 
and Order Commission (“ILOC”), Alaska’s reliance on a centralized form of law 
enforcement to cover an extremely sparsely populated land mass should be re-
considered.217 Giving tribal courts the ability to prosecute and incarcerate mem-
bers in a village while allowing for appeals to State courts would go a long way 
toward restoring faith in law enforcement in rural Alaska Native communities.218 
The State of Alaska has many legitimate concerns with granting additional 
tribal jurisdiction to Alaska Natives.219 After all, the American Indian model of 
having a complicated patchwork of legal jurisdictions because of reservations 
would not work well in Alaska.220 The State has legitimate concerns about the 
territorial scope of Alaska Native tribal court jurisdiction.221 With Alaska Natives 
being largely politically and socially integrated into Alaskan society, concerns 
about funding and constitutional rights for defendants are also well founded.222 
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Yet it is precisely for all of these reasons that the State of Alaska is in the 
best position to define the scope of Alaska Native tribal jurisdiction.223 If the 
State of Alaska were to grant additional limited tribal sovereignty to Alaska Na-
tive communities, Congress would see less reason for federal involvement.224 
Nothing prevents the State from granting tribal jurisdiction to Alaska Native 
communities where everything is appealable to State courts and is limited in ter-
ritorial reach, subject matter, and the parties involved.225 In fact, making these 
changes could relieve burdens on the State’s prison population, lower recidivism 
rates, and decrease costs borne by the judiciary.226 
If the State of Alaska really is “one country, one people,” it is time for the 
State to truly commit to protecting its most vulnerable citizens, even if it creates 
added complexity and grants some concurrent jurisdiction to Alaska Native trib-
al courts.227 By taking the lead in granting additional tribal jurisdiction to Alaska 
Natives, the State will be able to ensure that concerns about scope and constitu-
tional protections are appropriately addressed.228  
C. “Domestic Dependent” No More: The Judiciary Should Expand the 
Holding in John v. Baker by Giving Alaska Native Tribal Courts  
Inherent Sovereignty over Members in Limited Criminal Matters 
In 1998, in John v. Baker, the Alaska State Supreme Court held that Alaska 
Natives retain tribal sovereignty and authority with regard to internal tribal rela-
tions based on Federal common law.229 In her 2013 State of the Judiciary ad-
dress, the author of that opinion, Alaska State Supreme Court Chief Justice Dana 
Fabe, implored the Alaska State Legislature to partner with Alaska Native com-
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munities to effectively administer justice in the State.230 Chief Justice Fabe em-
phasized how the judiciary has worked on these problems for twenty years to 
help ensure that justice in Alaska Native rural communities is not “delivered in a 
far-off court by strangers,” but noted that there is still a long way to go.231 Alt-
hough she could give no definitive solutions or clear indications as to how the 
court would decide pending cases, Chief Justice Fabe appeared ready to extend 
the same reasoning used in Baker.232 
Chief Justice Fabe’s address is an indication that Alaska’s jurisprudence 
could continue to develop favorably for Alaska Native tribal sovereignty advo-
cates.233 Since courts have played a vital role in determining the scope of Native 
American sovereignty for centuries, the Alaska Supreme Court’s willingness to 
expand the scope of Alaska Native inherent tribal sovereignty in the absence of 
federal or state statutory guidance demonstrates that there is another way Alaska 
Natives can achieve greater local control.234 
The Alaska Supreme Court and federal courts should expand the interpreta-
tion of federal common law to hold that Alaska Natives retain inherent sover-
eignty with regard to regulating and punishing tribal members within their own 
community.235 The Alaska State Supreme Court can simply expand the list of 
inherent tribal activities for which an Alaska Native tribe remains sovereign to 
include specific criminal acts like domestic violence and sexual assault.236 By 
employing a narrow reading of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Venetie, the 
court should hold that while Alaska Natives have no jurisdiction based on Indian 
country, they do retain authority to “resolve . . . disputes between their own 
members” within the confines of their town sites.237 
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Despite these compelling reasons, such a sweeping change in the scope of 
Alaska Native tribal sovereignty could lead to some consequences.238 First, the 
Alaska Supreme Court or any other court would be unable to extend tribal sov-
ereignty to include jurisdiction over non-Natives without congressional action.239 
Second, any ruling must consider existing federal laws, including P.L. 280, the 
Major Crimes Act, and ANCSA’s extinguishment of Indian country in Alaska.240 
Furthermore, a court would need to consider the implications of such a holding, 
and the likelihood that the State of Alaska would appeal the decision to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which has been perceived as hostile to Native American and 
Alaska Native sovereignty movements.241 
Still, given the legal nature of these questions, it is inevitable that questions 
concerning the scope of Alaska Native tribal sovereignty for criminal matters are 
heard by the Alaska State Supreme Court.242 When that time comes, the court 
should hold that Alaska Natives have inherent tribal sovereignty over a limited 
number of criminal cases in their communities.243 Such a decision could provide 
an alternative form of justice to help the rural Alaska Native communities that 
need it the most.244 
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CONCLUSION 
Rural Alaska Native villages continue to search for solutions to what 
amounts to an epidemic of alcohol abuse, domestic violence, and sexual assault 
in their communities. The current legal framework developed piecemeal by 
Congress, the State of Alaska, and the judiciary does not allow Alaska Native 
communities to police themselves through the tribal governments and courts that 
have been in place for centuries in some communities. To solve these problems, 
Congress, the State of Alaska, and the courts should grant Alaska Natives addi-
tional limited tribal jurisdiction to combat these deep-seated problems with tac-
tics tailored to and rooted in the community itself. Currently proposed solutions, 
like the Alaska Safe Families and Villages Act, although a step in the right direc-
tion, do not go far enough to protect the lives of Alaska Natives. As long as basic 
constitutional protections remain in place for criminal defendants, ceding local 
control back to the communities who must deal with these rampant social ills on 
a daily basis seems like the best solution to what is, quite literally, a matter of life 
and death. 
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